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Women And The Making Of The Tunisian
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“The best nations are always those that accord women the greatest amount of liberty.”

(Charles Fourier, 1808)
“Just because we’ve overthrown the regime and managed to cobble together a constitution
does not mean the transition is over. It is only the beginning. People need to remember
that.”

(Issrar Chamekh, Student and Tunisian activist at i-Watch.)
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INTRODUCTION
The Jasmine Revolution of 2011 and the cascade of revolutions that
followed created a crucial, albeit narrow, window of opportunity for political
changes that could shape legal system reform across the Middle East and North
African (MENA) region.1 Revolutionaries in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and
Libya pushed for constitutional change as a necessary first step towards
transitioning to a more democratic state.2 Within this discourse, constitutional
reform movements became platforms for addressing deep-seated gender
inequalities.3 Women in Tunisia used their country’s constitution-making

1. See generally Katerina Dalacoura, The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political
Change and Geopolitical Implications, 88 INT’L AFFAIRS 63 (2012) (discussing the causes of the
Arab Spring and its potential geopolitical implications).
2. John Liolos, Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems and Promise of
Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219, 221-24 (2013); see also
Issandr El Amrani, Op-Ed., Egypt: A Constitution First, GUARDIAN COMMENT NETWORK, Jun. 12
2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jun/12/egypt-a-constitution-first.
(describing a statement by Egyptian activists that recommends the Tunisian model of political
transition).
3. See, e.g., RAINER GROTE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN
UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 628, 673 (2012). For a closer look at the popular debates around
gender-related issues in North African countries between 2011 and 2013, see generally ANDREA
KHALIL, CROWDS AND POLITICS IN NORTH AFRICA: TUNISIA, ALGERIA, AND LIBYA (2014).
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process as a vehicle for mobilizing local efforts, connecting with gender rights
advocates in other MENA countries, and participating in a transnational
dialogue.4 As a result, women’s participation became a key determinant of some
of the final draft’s constitutional guarantees on gender equality, religion-state
relations, rights in the family, rights to political participation, and the
employment of programmatic rights.
The constitution-making process in Tunisia built upon a long history of
attempts in other countries to shift from a top-down model of constitutionmaking, also known as the Lancaster Model, to one based on popular
participation.5 Over 200 new constitutions have been drafted since the postcolonial era.6 The earliest projects relied heavily on international experts outside
the country who either copy-pasted model provisions from international texts or
else borrowed from the country’s former colonizers.7 Since the 1980s, however,
countries have worked to adopt more autochthonous or hybrid processes that fit
the local context.8 This is based on the premise that popular participation in
constitution-making not only lends legitimacy to the text’s provisions, but is in
itself an exercise of democratic empowerment.9 In other words, constitutions can
provide new beginnings for a country; in post-conflict scenarios, they give
countries a forum for discussing the underlying tensions that gave rise to the
initial conflict.10 The more open a constitution-making process is to the public
and the institutions of civil society, the more likely the process will be more
democratic and representative.11
Based on these underlying principles, a nation’s drafting process has been
characterized generally by a greater degree of deliberation and is most often led
either by the standing legislature or by a nationally elected constituent

4. Giulia Daniele, Tunisian Women’s Activism after the January 14 Revolution: Looking
within and towards the Other Side of the Mediterranean, 15 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 16, 26-27
(2014).
5. Upendra Dev Acharya, Constitutionalism and Democracy in Nepal: What Went Wrong?
in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA 177,18891 (Veronica Federico & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2006). Alternative approaches to the Lancaster Model
emerged in the late 1990s. Frameworks vary, but the general consensus is that popular participation
is highly desirable, if not essential to successful constitution-making.
6. Jennifer Widner, Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1513, 1523 (2008).
7. Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The Diffusion of Constitutional Rights, 39 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 1 (2014).
8. Heinz Klug, Postcolonial Collages: Distributions of Power and Constitutional Models, 18
INT’L SOC. 114, 126-28 (2003).
9. VIVIEN
HART,
DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION-MAKING
(2003),
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr107.pdf.
10. Jamal Benomar, Constitution-Making After Conflict: Lessons for Iraq, 15 J. DEMOCRACY
81, 87 (2004).
11. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN.
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 201, 202-206 (2009) (providing a brief literature review on the waves of
constitutionalism and a wider discussion of the dynamics between public participation and
constitutional design).
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assembly.12 Although the emphasis is on creating a text that embodies a people’s
history and values, countries in transition will often draw on a “collage of
constitutional mechanisms and principles” at the international level to “produce
hybrid solutions tailored to” local imperatives.”13 A more recent approach
among legal scholars has been to look at the degree to which newly drafted
constitutions are “intermestic” – drawing on both domestic and international
influences.14 The hybridization of state reconstruction and the degree to which it
occurs has been particularly informative in the area of women’s rights. In many
instances, women who have played an active role in advancing gender equality
through constitutional reform have relied at least in part on a common core of
international norms reflected in instruments such as the Convention for the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant
for Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).15 They have used such texts
to reinforce their assertion that participation in the drafting process is not just
critical to the end result, rather it must be acknowledged as a normative claim in
and of itself.16 The right to participate in the decision-making affecting women’s
lives is one of the most significant rights to be claimed by women. The United
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women has
supported a women’s right to engage in constitution-making, stating:
“[G]ender-sensitive processes (e.g., guaranteeing women’s representation
in constitutional drafting bodies) and decisions on substance (e.g.,
adoption of a constitutional guarantee of gender equality) set a precedent
for women’s participation in social, economic, and political life in the
post-conflict period, as well as providing a legal base from which
women’s rights advocates can demand other types of gender-responsive
reform that unfolds in transitional periods when laws and institutions are
in flux.”17
This is not to say that the women who participate in the drafting process
should be characterized as a uniform force. Context will inevitably shape and
diversify women’s views of what warrants constitutional protection and whether

12. Widner, supra note 6 at 1532.
13. Klug, supra note 8 at 128.
14. Kevin L. Cope, The Intermestic Constitution: Lessons from the World’s Newest Nation,
53 VA. J. INT’L L. 667, 724 (2013).
15. Diane Elson & Jasmine Gideon, Organising for Women’s Economic and Social Rights:
How Useful Is the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? 8 J.
INTERDISC. GENDER STUD. 133, 135-138 (2004).
16. See generally HELEN IRVING, GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: EQUITY AND AGENCY IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (2008) (reviewing various strategies and mechanisms to
enhance women’s participation in the constitution drafting process and the significance of such
participation).
17. RANGITA DE SILVA DE ALWIS, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS:
LEADERSHIP
AND
POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION
(2012),
http://www2.unwomen.org/~/media/field%20office%20eseasia/docs/publications/2014/9/womens%
20human%20rights%20and%20national%20consitutions%20guidance%20note.ashx?v=1&d=20141
202T120321.
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international human rights standards comport with local belief systems or
cultural practices. In Tunisia, women’s participation consisted of a complex set
of interactions influenced by stakeholders with varying and sometimes
conflicting socio-political objectives. The inconsistencies that appear in the
constitution’s final text, as well as some of the challenges to passing
implementing legislation, are a testament to this.18 Yet the ways in which
participation unfolded, the forces at play, and their differing interests in drafting
the country’s gender rights provisions are issues that remain understudied. This
article attempts to glean from field interviews and secondary sources some of
the sociopolitical complexities that underlay women’s engagement in Tunisia’s
constitution-making process. Elucidating such complexities can provide further
insight into how women’s engagement impacted the substance and
enforceability of the constitution’s final text. We argue that, in spite of
longstanding roadblocks to implement and enforce constitutional guarantees, the
greater involvement of Tunisian women in the constitution drafting process did
make a difference in the final gender provisions of Tunisia’s constitution.
Although not all recommendations were adopted, Tunisian women were able to
use an autochthonous process to edify the country and set the foundation for
greater rights consciousness.
This article also seeks to define the degree and nature of external influence
on national efforts to advance women’s rights and on the drafting of Tunisia’s
gender provisions. Although our research suggests that international forces had
less of an impact on the Tunisian constitution-making process than we had
assumed initially, we also found that many Tunisian women still saw themselves
as part of a transnational women’s movement in which they were able to engage
with a broad network of international women’s groups and transnational
stakeholders. Our conclusion, thus, is that the Tunisian constitutional project, at
least in regards to its gender provisions, can be regarded as intermestic in the
sense that it drew directly or indirectly from both local and transnational
sources. This shows that even when drafters are able to create constitutions that
fit local contexts, they are still deeply influenced by international human rights
provisions and relevant structural frameworks.
Finally, this article summarizes some of the early efforts to translate
constitutional guarantees into enforceable legislation. While we have deemed
Tunisia’s drafting process as a success in participatory constitution-making, the
country has a considerable way to go to ensure that “equal opportunities for men
and women” as guaranteed in its new constitution become a reality for Tunisians
in their daily modes of existence.19
Applying Tunisia as a case study more generally, we argue
that women’s equal engagement can inform the constitutive and transformative
nature of constitution drafting. Such engagement allows civil society to address
challenges to the empowerment of women, create new narratives of nation
18.
19.

See infra Part II.
TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 46.
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building, and ensure that constitutional provisions are drafted in a gendersensitive manner. Women’s engagement should be premised on a dialogic,
human rights, analytical framework. While the primacy of rights must guide
constitutional change, international human rights must be premised on an
ongoing discourse that calls for simultaneous internal and cross-cultural
dialogue involving a plurality of voices, including the equal representation of
women. The emphasis here is on “ongoing.” Constitutional guarantees are not
guarantees until they are enforced without bias or exception. Participation in
constitution-drafting projects should not end with the final text, but must
continue with the formation of institutions that reflect and maintain the
constitution’s blue print for nation building.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a historical overview of
Tunisia’s constitution-making process and defines the major stakeholders
involved, as well as the varying dynamics among them. It then introduces a
comparative summary of how other countries have gradually shifted from the
Lancaster Model to a more participatory process that embraces women’s
inclusion in drafting constitutional rights provisions. Part II begins our case
study of Tunisia by detailing how some of the stakeholders mentioned in Part I
shaped the drafting process for certain gender provisions, the proposed texts as
well as subsequent revisions. Part II concludes by identifying some of the
inconsistencies found within the constitution’s final text, as well as preexisting
laws that have complicated the enactment of implementing legislation. Part III
moves on to consider the international forces involved in the drafting process,
and the extent to which international texts and softer modes of influence
determined the direction of Tunisia’s internal dialogue. It also considers whether
international organizations have played a part in resolving inconsistencies in the
legal framework. Finally, Part IV makes recommendations to actualize the
constitution’s gender provisions. It looks at the beginnings of some of these
efforts, as well as gives recommendations based on the experience of other
countries in transition.
This paper engages not just in textual interpretation and secondary sources,
but relies on in-depth interviews with some of the women stakeholders involved.
Our hope is that by speaking with those who were present on the ground during
the drafting process, we can provide greater insight into how provisions are
drafted, to what extent the participatory process succeeded in creating new
constitutional norms for a country in transition, and to what effect international
sources had in driving the constitution to a particular end result.
PART I
A. A Summary of Women’s Engagement in Tunisia’s Constitution-making
Process
Any consideration of women’s participation in drafting a new constitution
in Tunisia requires placing it in its historical context. The next section will
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DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38B56D41P

96

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 35:1

summarize the state of women’s activism prior to the revolution, the
sociopolitical complexities that challenged participation in the constitution
making process, and how women were able to coalesce in spite of these
challenges. Women’s activism has a long history in Tunisia. The literary works
of the author and reformer Tahar el-Haddad are hailed by many today as the
genesis of progressive women’s rights in Tunisia.20 His book, Our Women in
Shari’a and in Society (1930) inspired debate over the role of women in
Tunisian society and laid the groundwork for future popular struggles.21 Haddad
was also a pioneer of trade unionism in Tunisia, laying the groundwork for
today’s largest and most powerful labor union in Tunisia, the General Union of
Tunisian Workers (UGTT).22 His scholarship on women’s status in Tunisia was
informed, at least in part, by his critique of capitalism and familiarity with
European Marxism.23 Interestingly, Haddad’s works seemed to have influenced
the reforms included in Tunisia’s Personal Status Code (CSP), issued by the
country’s first president Habib Bourguiba in 1956.24 The purpose behind the
CSP, however, seems to have been less about feminism than about doing away
with traditions that impeded Bourguiba’s greater modernization program.25 The
Code abolished polygamy and the practice of repudiation, and granted women
suffrage and the right to initiate divorce, but did not explicitly make men and
women equal in all respects.26 For example, the CSP adopted a male preference
in inheritance law.27 Though the CSP was hailed by Western observers as a
marked improvement in the institutionalization of women’s rights, it had the
paradoxical effect of creating a Jacobin-like form of feminism that effectively
silenced alternative feminist viewpoints.28 State feminism thus became a strategy
to silence opposition while gaining the affections of external allies.
This strategy evolved during the Ben Ali regime to include methods of cooptation and division for the purposes of creating a narrow spectrum of activism
that allowed women’s organizations to exist only within a limited, heavily
monitored sphere.29 Those who resisted the regime’s tactics ultimately lost out
20. Lilia Labidi, The Nature of Transnational Alliances in Women’s Associations in the
Maghreb: The Case of AFTURD and ATFD in Tunisia, 3 J. MIDDLE EAST WOMEN’S STUD. 6, 9-12
(2007).
21. Id. For more information on the creation and development of women’s organizations
inspired by el-Haddad, see LAURIE A. BRAND, WOMEN, THE STATE, AND POLITICAL
LIBERALIZATION 202-22 (1998).
22. JOEL BEININ, WORKERS AND THIEVES: LABOR MOVEMENTS AND POPULAR UPRISINGS IN
TUNISIA AND EGYPT 13 (2016).
23. Id.
24. BRAND, supra note 21 at 178-79.
25. Id. at 180.
26. George N. Sfeir, The Tunisian Code of Personal Status (Majallat Al-Ahw Al Al-Shakhsiy
Ah), 11 MIDDLE EAST J. 309, 310 (1957).
27. Id. at 313-14.
28. Daniele, supra note 4 at 18-19.
29. Emma C. Murphy, Women in Tunisia: Between State Feminism and Economic Reform, in
WOMEN AND GLOBALIZATION IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST: GENDER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 169-
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on political resources and influence but maintained an independent form of
feminism that took hold after the regime’s fall. For example, The Tunisian
Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) and The Association of Tunisian
Women for Research on Development (AFTURD), both established in 1989,
successfully avoided “dictatorial drift”30 to become powerful forces of postregime activism, as we will see below.31 On the international front, Tunisia
continued to hold itself as a progressive Arab state, ratifying CEDAW in 1985,
albeit with numerous reservations related to Article 9(2) on equal rights with
regard to nationality of children, Article 16 on equality in marriage and family
life, and Article 29(1) relating to the administration of CEDAW provisions.32
Ben Ali became a vocal proponent of women’s economic participation, touting
state laws with regards to maternity leave and equal employment, but made little
actual efforts towards placing women in positions of leadership or providing
them with enforceable safeguards against substandard working conditions.33
In light of Tunisia’s complicated history, the 2011 revolution provided a
critical opportunity to replace the old hegemonic framework for women’s rights
with a new bottom-up model based on popular discourse and civil society-led
initiatives. Dr. Najet Limam-Tnani of the University of Tunis has commented
that the constitutional process “created a new pulse” for the women’s
movement.34 On October 23, 2011, over seven months after the fall of the
regime, the interim government held nationwide elections to determine the
composition of a 217-member, National Constituent Assembly (NCA) tasked
with drafting a new constitution.35 Women were well represented in most NCA
decision-making bodies, though only a handful of women were appointed to
significant positions of leadership.36 Many more women deputies joined the six
constituent committees in charge of drafting provisions under specific

70, 178-87 (Eleanor Abdella Doumato & Marsha Pripstein Posusney eds., 2003).
30. Guadalupe Martínez-Fuentes & Belhassen Ennouri, Changes and Persistence in the
Tunisian Organisational Network for the Promotion of Women, in PROMOTING WOMEN’S RIGHTS &
GENDER EQUALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 139 (2014), http://www.fepseurope.eu/assets/bd3344d3-a0fc-4582-9842e3b8ea4724a4/2014%2009%2003%20women’s%20rights%20mena_final.pdf.
31. See infra Part II.
,
32. Declarations,
Reservations,
and
Objections
to
CEDAW,
U.N.
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (last accessed Oct. 25, 2016).
33. Louisa Dris-Ait-Hamadouche, Women in the Maghreb, in NORTH AFRICA: POLITICS,
REGION, AND THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 202, 219 (Yahia H Zoubir & Haizam AmirahFernandez, eds., 2008).
34. Najet Limam-Tnani, “Quelle Révolution Pour les Femmes Tunisiennes: Printemps
Féministe our Hiver Islamiste?” Upholding Gendered Peace at a Time of War Conference, in Beirut,
Lebanon (June 9, 2015).
35. Lizzy Davis, Tunisian Elections: Polling Day as it Happened, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 23,
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2011/oct/23/tunisian-elections-2011-araband-middle-east-protests.
36. NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE CONSTITUANTE
DE
LA
TUNISIE, https://www.ndi.org/files/Tunisia-Gender-Assessment-National-ConstituentAssembly-FRE.pdf.
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constitutional themes. Notably, the only committee headed by a woman was the
Committee on Human Rights and Liberties, which was responsible for most
issues related to women’s rights.37
The NCA held its inaugural session on November 22, 2011 and drafting
began shortly thereafter, on February 13, 2012.38 The entire project resulted in
four drafts of the Constitution and took a little under two years to complete. The
final draft was passed by an article-by-article vote on January 26, 2014. From
the beginning there was consensus among women NCA members that the new
constitution must uphold and advance women’s rights. To that end, women took
steps to form a caucus that would promote a unified women’s rights agenda.
However, diverging conceptions of what such an agenda should look like or
what the role of women in Tunisian society should be impeded the caucus’
capacity to hold together as a unifying force. Though women deputies expressed
in interviews a broad range of perspectives on women’s rights in Tunisia, most
gravitated towards either a moderate Islamist position espoused by the majority
party, Ennahda, or the modern secularist position of Ennahda’s biggest rival,
Nidaa-Tounis. Even when women’s views aligned, these political parties were
less than eager for their members to be drawn off to an issue-based coalition that
crossed party lines. While Nidaa-Tounis feared that Ennahda was not as
‘moderate’39 as it held itself out to be and thus might undermine safeguards set
by the Bourguiba regime in the country’s 1959 Personal Status Code, NidaaTounis was repeatedly accused of fraternizing with crony capitalists and
political elites under the prior regime. Though Ennahda, and in particular
Ennahda’s women members, insisted on demonstrating good intentions in both
maintaining and furthering women’s rights guarantees, anti-Islamist rhetoric
exacerbated tensions between the two parties and inevitably created an
atmosphere of mutual suspicion that often led to serious blockages during
constitutional debate. In short, the caucus initiative never fully formalized,
though women members did re-coalesce at crucial moments to push through
certain rights provisions, most notably Article 46 requiring the state to take steps
towards eliminating violence against women.

37. THE CARTER CENTER, THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS IN TUNISIA: FINAL REPORT
2011-2014, 32 (2014).
38. NCA to Hold Inaugural Session on November 22, TUNIS AFRIQUE PRESSE (Nov. 12,
2011), http://www.pm.gov.tn/pm/actualites/actualite.php?lang=en&id=5058; see also Al-Bawsala,
Drafting the Constitution of the Tunisian Republic (in Arabic), (Sep. 2012),
http://www.albawsala.com/uploads/documents/Projet_Brouillon_Constit.pdf.
39. Since its foray into the political scene, Ennahda has held itself out as the latest
reincarnation of a moderate Islamist movement led by activists and Islamic intellectuals from the
early 1980s onwards. Ben Ali used an aggressive form of secularism to suppress the movement’s
growth and bar its presence in associative spaces. By contrast, Nidaa-Tounis became a loose
conglomeration of leftists, progressivists, and secularists, some of whom were suspected to be a part
of the “old guard.” Divisions between the two parties, thus, were not purely ideological, but also
driven by historical circumstances. Interview with Salsabil Klibi, Professor at La Faculté des
Sciences Juridiques (May 27, 2015).
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Similar divides created challenges for building a united women’s rights
movement outside of the NCA. Rapid liberalization of the associative space
after the revolution resulted in a flourishing of women’s interest groups,
representing a wide variety of perspectives.40 This explosion of civic action was
positive in many ways, but it also created difficulties in finding common ground.
The most visible debate largely mapped onto what was unfolding in the NCA.
Older progressivists, popularly referred to as the “Daughters of Bourguiba,”
often were at loggerheads with younger Islamists who championed themselves
as the “Daughters of Khadija.”41 Supporters in both camps engaged in several
competing demonstrations or marches that resulted in competing discourses over
various women’s rights issues. On the sidelines, however, groups without
political representation in the NCA were asserting their own views of the
constitution and its role in furthering women’s rights. For example, proponents
of political Salafism, a more extreme form of Islam that requires Shari’a law as
the sole source for legislation, did not win any seats in the NCA but has gained
traction since 2011, particularly among the urban poor and youth.42 Many
Tunisian men and women who have felt their country has lost a sense of self
have been drawn to Salafism because of its anti-establishment discourse and
adherence to traditional values.43 Many Salafis reject the campaign for women’s
rights as an imported Western construct unrepresentative of Tunisia’s own
religious norms and values. The divisions between Salafis and other civil society
groups resulted in several clashes with security forces and a wave of reported
attacks against unveiled women and secular women’s associations.44
Tunisian youth also expressed feelings of social and political
marginalization during the drafting process. Though young Tunisians were
critical stakeholders in the 2011 revolution and have remained vocal during the
transition process, many have struggled post-revolution to find a political space
in which they can push forward their interests. This is troubling, given that over
54% of Tunisia is under the age of thirty and that youth have been one of the

40. Some of the organizations mentioned in interviews include: Front of Women for Equality,
Nawaas, Women and Dignity, Forum of Tunisian Women, Tunisian Association of Progressive
Women, Voices of Women, Equality and Parity, Beity, League of Tunisian Women Voters.
Moderate Islamist organizations such as Women and Complementarity, and the Tounissiet
Association for Women and Development unified under a common banner to counter anti-Islamist
discourse issued by modern secularists.
41. Lamia Ben Youssef, Lecture at Oxford University (Oct. 27, 2014), (audio recording at
https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/daughters-bourguiba-daughters-khadija-mythical-genealogy-and-futuresecular-and-islamic).
42. See Monica Marks, Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi
Current, 18 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 104, 110-111 (2013).
43. See, e.g., id. (“Young women in the movement – for there are many female jihadi Salafis,
though their activism is often self-segregated by sex – often appear to revel in expressions of gender
performance, such as wearing niqab or refusing to shake hands and mix socially with young men.
Such practices set them apart and seem to reinforce feelings of difference and, sometimes,
superiority.”)
44. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Springtime for Salafists, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar. 26, 2013.
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social categories most vulnerable to urgent issues, such as prolonged
unemployment and domestic and economic violence.45 During the constitutionmaking process, youth criticized the NCA as primarily representing an older
generation that could not relate to young Tunisians’ experiences or share in a
common set of values.46 This gave rise to a growing mistrust on the part of
young people towards establishment organizations that appear to draw too close
to political and business elites who benefitted under Ben Ali.47 Such criticism
was reserved in particular for the UGTT and its fellow Quartet members.48
While the UGTT proved crucial during the interim government as a moderator
for brokering interests and held itself out during the drafting process as a
representative of working-class interests, some felt that over time, it succumbed
to internal fracturing and subsequent disenchantment among its youth chapters.
Some even accused UGTT leadership as subservient to moneyed interests rather
than to its core members.49 Disgruntled revolutionaries in their determination to
stay relevant began assembling their own civil society initiatives including
NGOs like Jamaity,50 media outlets like Nawaat,51 and watchdog groups like AlBawsala.52 These new programs were intended to provide an alternative
perspective to what was happening on the ground. NGOs and grassroots
initiatives, lacking in domestic resources, often allied with foreign organizations
for funding and outreach purposes.53
These shifting alliances and mounting tensions in both the NCA and civil
society is hardly surprising given Tunisia’s lengthy authoritarian history and
sudden transition to a more democratic state. Yet it is remarkable that, in spite of
these challenges, Tunisian women were still able to unite at critical junctures for

45. See Graham Usher, The Reawakening of Nahda in Tunisia, MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH AND
INFORMATION PROJECT (Apr. 30, 2011), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero043011.
46. See Emily Parker, Tunisian Youth: Between Political Exclusion and Civic Engagement,
TUNISIA LIVE (June 24, 2013), http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/06/14/tunisian-youth-betweenpolitical-exclusion-and-civic-engagement/.
47. Kate McCabe, Dreams of January, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
https://www.ictj.org/dreams-january-tunisia/ (last accessed Oct. 25 2016).
48. Anouar Boukhars, The Reckoning: Tunisia’s Perilous Path to Democratic Stability,
CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
PEACE
(Apr.
2,
2015),
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/02/reckoning-tunisia-s-perilous-path-to-democraticstability/i5cj. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet includes UGTT along with three other civil
society organizations. The group was instrumental in the drafting process and won the Nobel Peace
Prize for its efforts in 2015.
49. Id.
50. Interview with Souhayel Hedfi, via Skype (June 9, 2015); see also Amel Boubekeur,
Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained Competition, 21
MEDITERRANEAN POL. 107, 111-15 (2016).
51. NAWAAT EN FRANCAIS, http://nawaat.org/portail/fr/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
52. Infra notes 147-48.
53. See Daniele, supra note 4, at 27.
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the purpose of furthering women’s constitutional rights.54 While some women’s
associations that pre-dated the revolution were discarded as “holdouts” of the
Ben Ali era, others rose to become powerful forums of activism, maintaining
political independence in order to build broad coalitions covering an array of
organizations and corresponding interests. The ATFD and AFTURD were
particularly effective in creating inter-organizational activities that centered on
common—usually left-leaning—civic campaigns.55 One example of this was the
LamEchaml network consisting of sixty organizations tied together by principles
such as gender equality and separation of religion and state.56 There was also a
concerted effort to repeal all existing reservations under CEDAW and
incorporate its provisions in the constitutional text.57 ATFD and AFTURD thus
became champions for causes that both radical grassroots organizations and
conservative, politically-connected organizations could rally behind.
The greatest coalescing moment for women’s groups came immediately
after the NCA published its first draft on August 8, 2012.58 The draft text
referred to the “complementarity” of women and men, a term that many women
activists felt backslid away from protections under the CSP and threatened the
campaign for greater gender parity.59 A mass sit-in was organized that same day
in front of the NCA building and on August 13, Tunisian Women’s Day,
thousands gathered across the country to support the equal protection of men
and women under the constitution.60
Women’s organizations were also effective as poll-watchers, rigorously
monitoring the NCA while identifying inadequacies in the drafting process.
Though many have applauded the NCA in its efforts to include civil society, as
we will see in Part II, others felt the Assembly could have gone further. For
example, the NCA only permitted one multi-day period during which civil
society organizations were invited to come and engage in open dialogue with
NCA members.61 Some organizations, including ATFD, LTDH, and
International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) boycotted this event, sensing
that the discussion could not be productive if draft guarantees had not been set.62

54. See Tunisian Women and their Role in the Success of “The Jasmine Revolution”, DW
News (Mar. 8 2011), http://www.dw.com/ar/ﺍاﻝلﻡمﺭرﺃأﺓة-ﺍاﻝلﺕتﻭوﻥنﺱسﻱيﺓة-ﻭوﺩدﻭوﺭرﻩهﺍا-ﻑفﻱي-ﺇإﻥنﺝجﺍاﺡح-ﺙثﻭوﺭرﺓة-a/ﺍاﻝلﻱيﺍاﺱسﻡمﻱيﻥن14896373 (translated by the author).
55. Anna Antonakis-Nashif, Contested Transformation: Mobilized Publics in Tunisia between
Compliance and Protest, 21 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 128, 135-36 (2016).
56. Martínez-Fuentes, supra note 30, at 144.
57. Id. at 139-40.
58. Interview with Anware Mnasri (June 2, 2015).
59. Id.
60. THE CARTER CENTER, supra note 37, at 35.
61. JASON GLUCK & MICHELE BRANDT, PARTICIPATORY AND INCLUSIVE CONSTITUTION
MAKING: GIVING VOICE TO THE DEMANDS OF CITIZENS IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB SPRING 9
(2015).
62. Des Associations et Organisations Boycottent le Dialogue Sur le Project de Constitution,
TUNIS AFRIQUE PRESSE, Sept. 18, 2012.
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Similarly, the NCA held only one national consultation process. Monitoring
organizations expressed concern that the process was too rushed to be effective:
the NCA held public sessions from December through January 2013 in all of
Tunisia’s 24 governorates at a rate of six governorates per weekend.63 The first
round of sessions commenced merely two days after the second draft’s
publication on December 14, 2012, which resulted in low turnout and hardly
gave citizens adequate time to review. Monitoring organizations also noted
feelings of exclusion among youth—over 45% of individuals ages 15-29 felt
like they were not involved in the drafting process and 56% indicated complete
unawareness as to the substance of the draft provisions.64
By spring of 2013, the situation seemed to be spiraling out of control.
Growing resentment towards the NCA resulted in fallouts between political
parties and their constituents. Deadlock during revision meetings and the
inadvertent release of a third draft on April 22, 2013, did not increase
confidence in the NCA’s ability to reach a satisfactory final draft. The
assassination of opposition politician, Mohamed Brahmi triggered massive
protests in July 2013 calling for the government to resign.65 Over sixty
opposition members walked out of the NCA shortly thereafter.66 When a final
draft was finally passed by an assembly vote on January 26, 2014, it came
amidst much political unrest and uncertainty of the constitution’s future
implementation.67
The surrounding turmoil did not stop women deputies, with the support of
civil society groups, from coming together in the final moments to pass critical
provisions guaranteeing the equality of women, as well as state requirements to
protect women against violence and abusive working conditions. Such notable
steps in the advancement and protection of women’s rights should not be
forgotten. We should applaud the efforts of women’s organizations in Tunisia to
rally around common objectives, in spite of the divisions that seemed to
permeate among them and the rest of society.
B. Countries in Transition: Building a Public Participatory Framework for
Gender Rights
Stepping back from the constitution-making process in Tunisia and the role
of women in enacting gender rights provisions, it is first helpful to look at what

63.
64.

THE CARTER CENTER, supra, note 37, at 70.
U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, ENQUETE NATIONALE SUR LES ATTENTES DES JEUNES À
L’ÉGARD DU PROCESSUS CONSTITUTIONNEL ET DE LA TRANSITION DÉMOCRATIQUE EN TUNISIE:
RAPPORT DE SYNTHÈSE 11 (2013).
65. Suspect Arrested in Murder of Tunisian Opposition MP, AL-ARABIYA (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/02/09/Suspect-arrested-in-murder-ofTunisian-opposition-MP.html.
66. Tunisia Mourns Slain Soldiers, JORDAN TIMES, July 9, 2013.
67. LA FACULTE DE SCIENCES JURIDIQUES DE TUNIS, PROCESSUS DE REDACTION DE LA
CONSTITUTION [The Drafting Process of the Constitution] (January 2015).
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other countries have done as a common reference point. National constitutions
are recognized today as the supreme law of the land and, as the source of their
power, they define both the citizenship rights and the responsibilities that then
serve to regulate institutions and government and hold decision makers of the
state accountable to those rights. The specific way in which a country’s
constitution shapes each aspect of state power will either facilitate or limit the
opportunities for advancing gender equality. Over the last four decades, over
200 new constitutions have been drafted, including many in post-conflict
countries. These constitutions have been written in the Balkans, Cambodia,
Lebanon, East Timor, Rwanda, Chad, Mozambique, Bougainville-Papua New
Guinea, Nepal, and the Comoros, to name a few. They include countries
emerging from colonization from French and British colonial empires and
countries in Eastern and Central Europe after the collapse of Soviet Communist
rule in 1991.68
The Lancaster House Constitution, a top-down model of constitution
making developed as part of the negotiations that led to Zimbabwe’s
independence from the United Kingdom in 1980, is no longer considered a
tenable model.69 The Lancaster House model relied on international experts
outside the country to draft provisions without the participation of the people.70
Constitutions following this method, primarily those during the period of
decolonization after the Second World War, tended simply to copy the basic
constitutional rules of their former colonial masters.71 Over the past few decades,
however, constitution making has transformed from mimicking the constitutions
of colonial rulers to either autochthonous constitution-making or hybrid
processes that fit the local context.72 Even when peace accords were
internationally forged or constitutions were informed by foreign experts, there is
a general perception that constitutions from the 1980s onward have been shaped
by a more participatory process, characterized by a greater degree of
deliberation and most often led by a national constituent assembly.73
Though the constitution-making process differs from country to country, it
usually involves the following stages: (1) assessment of the need for a new
constitution; (2) agreement on the rules concerning how to proceed with
constitution-building; (3) establishment of a representative body to prepare a

68. See generally Widner, supra note 6 (providing an overview of the constitution-writing
process in countries following independence from Britain, France, and the Soviet Union).
69. Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Determination in Principle and Practice: The EthiopianEritrean Experience, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 91, 130-31 (1997).
70. Id.
71. Stacy R. Sandusky, Women’s Political Participation in Developing and Democratizing
Countries: Focus on Zimbabwe, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 253, 256-57 (1999); see also Robert P.
Wasson Jr., The AIDS Crisis as an Impetus to Law Reform in the United States and Kenya, 17
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 31 (1994) (noting that the extension of “colonial” rights has
frustrated the development of a political culture that respects individual rights).
72. See Klug, supra note 8, at 126-28.
73. Selassie, supra note 69, at 131-32.
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draft of the new constitution that includes a public consultation process; (4)
consideration and debate of the draft; (5) referendum; (6) adoption of the new
constitution; and (7) implementation.74 The country overviews below focus
primarily on stages three, four, and seven. Our effort here is to show that
constitution-making is an exercise in democratic empowerment and can help
shape nation-building; that the constitution and democratic governance may lose
legitimacy if people feel disenfranchised by the process. Public participation
allows women and others who have been marginalized from democratic
processes to claim a constitution as their own. National dialogue and civic
education can address underlying causes of conflict and help citizens to define a
national identity and a shared vision for the future. Although international law
does not spell out rules for drafting constitutions, most of the constitutionmaking processes of the past two decades have attempted this in different ways.
Preparatory civic education, teaching both large constitutional principles and the
finer details of the drafting and adoption processes has become a cornerstone of
constitution-making.75
The electoral rules and procedures that determine which interest groups are
represented on constitution-building bodies are critical for guaranteeing the role
of women in the process of drafting, revising, and adopting a constitution. The
goal should be to design rules that promote a broad representation of women and
overcome traditional gender biases that have led to women’s comparative social,
economic, or educational disadvantage. For example, South Africa was the first
country in which men and women sat in equal numbers in the constitutionmaking body.76 Its constitution-making process is regarded as a good example of
a participatory constitution-making process.77 Similarly, Nepal’s Interim
Constitution established the Constituent Assembly to draft the new constitution
on the basis of a mix of first-past-the-post elections, proportional representation,
and appointments (with approximately 55% of candidates to be elected through
proportional representation), and ensured women’s inclusion by requiring that:
“political parties… take into account the principle of inclusiveness” while
selecting candidates for first-past-the-post elections, and that “political parties…
ensure proportional representation of the women, Dalit, oppressed
communities/indigenous peoples, backward regions, Madhesi, and other
Classes.”78 In addition, the Interim Constitution required that “at least one-third
of such total number of candidates nominated… be women.”79
Once the drafting process has begun, some countries have successfully
used women’s charters as instruments for consolidating women’s rights

74.
DE SILVA DE ALWIS, supra note 17, at 1.
75. Benomar, supra note 10, at 88.
76. Vijayashri Sripati, Constitutionalism in India and South Africa: A Comparative Study
from a Human Rights Perspective, 16 TUL. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 49, 90 (2007).
77. Id. at 56-58.
78. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL 2007, January 15, 2007, art. 63 §4.
79. Id. at art. 63 §5.
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demands. Turning back to South Africa, this technique proved crucial for
unifying the women’s movement where no unification had previously existed. In
1992, the South African Women’s National Coalition began raising public
awareness and promoting considerable debate on women’s issues. During this
process it identified several major concerns: inclusivity in decision-making,
promotion of women’s awareness and rights, gender equality and women’s
unity.80 When the drafting of a new constitution began in April 1994, the South
African Constituent Assembly began an expansive participatory process built on
three major pillars of inclusivity, accessibility and transparency. 81 The first
building block was an educational campaign (using newspapers, billboards,
radio, TV and a hotline) to educate the public about cardinal constitutional
issues and their right to participate in the constitution-making process.82 More
than 1,000 educational workshops were held over a period of a year.83 Public
consultations gave members of the Constituent Assembly the opportunity to
meet with members of the community and all recommendations were
transcribed and collated.84 Public consultations were also held on specific
subjects, such as the bill of rights, the judiciary and the administration.
The South African Constituent Assembly held two years of transparent
deliberations with ample public input. All constitutional debates were published
and broadcast, citizens could tune in to educational radio programs, and parties
carried out consultations at the provincial level.85 Citizens at large submitted two
to three million proposals and suggestions to the Assembly.86 As a result, the
constitution of South Africa has enjoyed remarkably high legitimacy,

80. Ronalda Murphy, Constitutional Rights Discourse: Canadian and South African Feminist
Engagements, in WOMEN MAKING CONSTITUTIONS: NEW POLITICS AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 20, 21-32 (Alexandra Dobrowolsky & Vivien Hart eds., 2003).
81. Catherine Albertyn, Towards Substantive Representation: Women and Politics in South
Africa, in WOMEN MAKING CONSTITUTIONS: NEW POLITICS AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 20,
99-102 (Alexandra Dobrowolsky & Vivien Hart eds., 2003); see also Rangita de Silva de Alwis,
Implementing
the
Constitution:
The
Way
Forward
(working
paper)
(2014),
http://www.50x50movement.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Tunisia-Working-Papers.pdf.
82. MICHAEL BRANDT ET AL., CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND REFORM: OPTIONS FOR THE
PROCESS
93
(2011),
http://constitutionmakingforpeace.org/wpcontent/themes/cmp/assets/handbooks/Constitution-Making-Handbook-English.pdf.
83. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INTERNATIONAL, LESSONS LEARNED FROM CONSTITUTIONMAKING: PROCESSES WITH BROAD BASED PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 6 (2011)
84. Catherine Barnes & Eldred De Klerk, South Africa’s Multi-Party Constitutional
Negotiation Process, in OWNING THE PROCESS: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PEACEMAKING (2002).
For more information on the public consultation process, see HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A
NATION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA 32-33 (1998).
85. Brandt, supra note 82, at 94; cf. Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa’s Final
Constitution from a Human-Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 70-71 (1999) (questioning
the extent to which public participation impacted the final text and notes some level of skepticism
that political party dynamics may have overshadowed citizens’ input).
86. Albie Sachs, The Creation of South Africa’s Constitution, 41 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 669,
675 (1996).
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particularly in regards to women’s rights and programmatic rights affecting the
status of women in South African society.
Efforts to foster long-term public participation through adequate
transparency have also been effective in other African countries, such as
Namibia and Eritrea. In Namibia, the public was well-informed about
constitutional issues through the election campaigns of political parties, and the
national radio network helped educate the public on key issues. The Eritrean
process’s initial public-education phase included four-day training seminars for
around four-hundred Eritreans.87 These trainees would then conduct public
consultations at the village level regarding the constitutional commission’s
proposals. Comments were considered during the revision process. The third
phase included the recordation and collection of opinions expressed at public
debates in various localities around the revised version of those proposals.88
In contrast, the Cambodian public never got to participate closely with the
constitution drafting sessions and had little input in the text of its constitution.89
Structural barriers excluded Cambodia’s human rights organizations from
consultation and limited their role to lobbying the Constituent Assembly for
stronger women’s rights provisions. With assistance from the UN mission,
human rights organizations were able to promote civic education and raise
public awareness of the constitution’s importance for human rights.90 Buddhist
clergy were especially helpful at reaching people in remote areas. NGOs hosted
members of the constituent assembly at public meetings.91 Villages were
reached indirectly through leaflets, brochures, stickers, posters, and broadcasts.92
It is unclear however, how this impacted the final version of the constitutional
text and its implementation.
Sometimes non-governmental organizations with deep networks into civil
society can influence the content and direction of the constitution-making
process. For example, in Nicaragua, the influential Luisa Amanda Espinoza
Association of Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE), a Sandinista mass organization,
helped women participate in the open forums organized to evaluate the different
drafts of the Constitution. AMNLAE helped women to understand the
intricacies of writing a constitution and helped to explain technicalities by
describing the constitution as the mother law and statutes as its progeny.93 Seven
forays were held specifically for women. Women’s participation helped to
change both the content of the Constitution and the discourse that followed its

87. Selassie, supra note 69, at 132-33.
88. Id. at 134-37.
89. Stephen P. Marks, The Process of Creating a New Constitution in Cambodia, in FRAMING
THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 207, 219-24 (Laurel
E. Miller ed., 2010).
90. Id. at 220-21.
91. Id. at 218.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 217.
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promulgation. In calling for a more inclusive definition of family, the women’s
groups challenged discrimination against children born out of wedlock. Women
also advocated for equal pay for equal work and equality in the military. Even
when they failed to reach their goals, such as establishing a right to divorce,
women’s participation helped ignite a debate on issues that were hitherto
considered taboo.94
Facilitating public participation through a policy of transparency appears
easier in an age of social media. Novel mechanisms that utilize social media
platforms might be particularly successful in small states. In Iceland, a mass
social media campaign was deployed as a key impetus for drafting the country’s
constitution.95 Through media advertisements and social media, the drafters
solicited the public at large to send messages and submit comments online.96
These messages were posted after review and clearance by the council’s staff.97
Daily posts by the council’s staff included interviews with council members on
social media, and live broadcasts of the council’s weekly meetings appeared on
the council’s website and on Facebook.98
Transparency efforts, however, require a sense of security for effectiveness.
A lack of security can inhibit true participation during the drafting process, even
when there is a participatory framework in place. For example, in Afghanistan,
official reports asserted that “the Ministry of Women’s Affairs collected ideas
from women, which were forwarded to the Constitutional Commission.”99 The
Ministry also held women’s community meetings in groups of 30-60 to have
them prepare statements on their ideas to submit to the Constitutional
Commission.100 Finally, the Ministry established community radio broadcasts
and went to villages raising awareness of women about the Constitution. In spite
of these efforts, the drafting process has been described as only a tepid step in
the right direction with mixed end results. A number of organizations involved
in the constitution-making process expressed that a pervading lack of security
hampered women’s ability participate in the formal process, though the
opportunity to participate was present in theory.101

94. See Martha I. Morgan, Founding Mothers: Women’s Voices and Stories in the 1987
Nicaraguan Constitution, 70 B.U.L. REV. 1, 19 (1990).
95. Katrín Oddsdóttir, Iceland: The Birth of the World’s First Crowd-Sourced Constitution, 3
CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 1207, 1213-16 (2014).
96. Id. at 1215-16.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1215; see also Pere Simon Castellano, The Rule of e-law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
12TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON E-GOVERNMENT 128, 131-32 (2012).
99. Women’s Participation in the Constitution-Making Process in Afghanistan: Fact Sheet,
WOMEN’S
COUNCIL
(Sep.
15,
2003),
http://2002-2009U.S.-AFGHAN
usawc.state.gov/news/24277.htm.
100. Id.
101. Elizabeth Katz, Women’s Involvement in International Constitution-Making, in FEMINIST
CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 204, 205-07 (Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez, &
Tsvi Kahana eds., 2012).
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Once provisions of the text have been adopted, stakeholders in the
constitution-making process must continue efforts to ensure that constitutional
guarantees are implemented in legislation to push new norms. The promise of a
participatory constitution-making is fulfilled only when constitutional
guarantees are enforceable. Unfortunately, few countries have created
institutional arrangements and accountability frameworks that are successful. A
part of enforceability is dependent on the precision of the text itself. In other
words, some of the constitutional provisions go beyond the normative
guarantees to enshrine institutional frameworks for the application of those
norms. For example, the Rwandan Constitution in its preamble states that it is
“committed to ensuring equal rights between Rwandans and between women
and men without prejudice to the principles of gender equality and
complementarity in national development.”102 However, it does not stop at the
preamble—Chapter 2 of the Rwandan Constitution, which outlines the
fundamental principle of the state, commits to “equality of all Rwandans . . . by
ensuring that women are granted at least thirty percent of posts in decisionmaking organs.”103
Several constitutions recognize the multiple grounds of discrimination
based on gender and require state action against such discrimination. For
example, the South African Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex,
pregnancy, marital status and sexual orientation and binds both private and
public actors to this guarantee. Section 9 of the South African Constitution calls
for “legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.”104 The Ugandan
Constitution also calls upon parliament to make relevant laws, including laws
for “the establishment of an equal opportunities commission.”105 Article 48 of
the Constitution of Paraguay was amended in 2011 to read: “Men and women
have equal civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. The State will
promote the conditions and will create the adequate mechanisms for, making
equality real and effective, by leveling [allanando] the obstacles that prevent or
hinder its exercise and facilitating the participation of women in all areas
[ámbitos] of the national life.”106 Though there is reason for skepticism as to the
effectiveness in implementation, such provisions at the very least place a
constitutional obligation on the state to establish mechanisms protecting against
gender discrimination in its various forms.
Finally, some countries have placed certain guarantees, such as equality in
employment and the right to affirmative action, directly in the constitutional

102.
103.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA MAY 26, 2003, preamble §10.
Id. at art. 9 §4; see generally ELIZABETH POWLEY, RWANDA: THE IMPACT OF WOMEN
LEGISLATORS ON POLICY OUTCOMES AFFECTING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 2, (2007) (debating the
significance and impact of gender equality provisions in Rwanda’s gender equality provisions).
104. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §9(2).
105. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, 1995, art. 32 §2.
106. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY, 1992, art. 48.
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text. At a minimum, where a constitution contains provisions governing
employment, such provisions should comprise a general guarantee of the right to
work alongside a guarantee of equality or non-discrimination, such as stating
that “The right to work is recognized and is equal for all” (Burkino Faso, see
below) or requiring equal pay for equal work. Another set of more protective
constitutional provisions are those which would explicitly prohibit employment
discrimination on the basis of sex and/or gender, including specific aspects of
labor rights such as access to employment and remuneration. For example,
Article 35 of the Ethiopian Constitution provides that “[w]omen shall have a
right to equality in employment, promotion, pay, and the transfer of pension
entitlements.”107 Such specific rights guarantees can become important tools for
advancing gender equality in a society, provided the protections for these
guarantees are contained elsewhere and also apply to women. For example,
Article 116(2) of the Greek Constitution guarantees affirmative action as a way
to address a legacy of discrimination against women: “Adoption of positive
measures for promoting equality between men and women does not constitute
discrimination on the basis of sex. The State shall attend to the elimination of
inequalities actually existing, especially to the detriment of women.”108
Despite the importance of comparative practices, the most important
aspect of designing a strategy for national reconstruction is the critical role
played by context.109 Strategies for creating and enforcing rights guarantees do
not always migrate very effectively between countries.110 A plan that produces
good results in one country cannot simply transfer itself wholesale to another.
Too many of the enabling conditions will be different, and the opportunities and
limits for promoting gender equality will vary depending on whether
constitutional reform is post-conflict or an effort to revise an existing
constitution.
One kind of enabler that is often overlooked is the constitutional provisions
defining the structure and mechanisms of government. Key structural issues that
may impact gender equality relate to: whether government is decentralized (e.g.,
through federalism); the electoral system and its design (e.g., whether it includes
gender quotas); and the relationship between the branches of government,
including the role and composition of the judiciary and the extent to which
gender is mainstreamed in legislative and administrative processes. The impact
of decentralization on women’s rights will again vary depending on local
conditions. On the one hand, women may have greater access to local decisionmaking entities than at the national level, and may be able to achieve change
that is more immediate and responsive to gender realities than that which comes
from centralized governments. Local governments are also often mandated to
implement laws that have particular relevance to women, such as family law,

107.
108.
109.
110.

CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, art. 35, §8.
1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] ART. 19.
DE SILVA DE ALWIS, supra note 17, at 1-2.
Id.
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meaning that women may have a greater opportunity to participate more directly
in government decisions that significantly impact their lives. However, at the
same time, there may be resource constraints in local government centers, and
traditional or religious authorities are more likely to dominate at local levels;
both of these factors may limit the capacity of local government centers to fully
advance women’s rights and gender equality. Moreover, devolution of power
tends to benefit groups that are regionally or territorially defined (e.g.
indigenous or other minority groups); because women are not a homogenous
group, decentralization will not strengthen their autonomy but instead mean that
their rights will vary from region to region.
C. The Role of International Actors in Drafting Gender Sensitive Provisions
The international arena has given unprecedented visibility to the plight of
women globally. As a group of scholars have commented, “‘[w]omen’s rights as
humans rights’ has become a familiar slogan, bandied about by even the most
unlikely international bureaucrat.”111 There have been a slew of international
efforts to tackle a range of issues related to the inequality of women, from
domestic violence, to political representation, to freedom of choice in cases of
abortion and reproductive health, as well as a right to decent working conditions,
including maternity leave and the creation of safe spaces. Many of the
constitutional provisions cited above are deeply influenced by international
actors seeking to diffuse gender norms reflected in international law. The
creation and application of treaties has been the most common and arguably
most powerful tool for legitimizing calls for greater women’s rights and gender
equality. Women’s rights activists on both the international and national level
have pointed to provisions in widely ratified treaties and accepted interpretations
of those provisions as the basis for incorporating such provisions at the national
and subnational level.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) refers to the rights,
freedoms, and equal protection for men and women in Articles 2, 7, 16, and
25.112 Drawing on the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) requires that “[e]ach State Party. . .undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.”113 Further, “[e]very citizen shall
have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the conduct of

111. Doris Buss et al., Introduction to ‘Sexual Movements and Gendered Boundaries: Legal
Negotiations of the Global and the Local’, 14 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 5, 5 (2005).
112. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
113. G. A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2
(Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6
I.L.M. 360 (1967).
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public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”114 General
Comment 25, paragraph 6 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC), the body responsible for protecting and promoting provisions of the
ICCPR, further defines the conduct of public affairs to encompass constitutionmaking processes.115 The UNHRC has likewise recommended that countries,
particularly countries in transition, “should reopen talks on the constitutional
reform in a transparent process and on a wide participatory basis.”116
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), often referred to as the international bill of rights for
women, more adequately defines discrimination on the basis of sex,117 and in
Article 7 calls for states to ensure women’s equal rights to participate in political
and public life and to have equal access to all aspects of civil society.118 It has
been ratified by 189 countries, and the convention’s committee oversees
ongoing efforts to incorporate its text and general principles at the national as
well as local level.119 Beyond formal incorporation, however, the CEDAW
General Recommendation No. 23 further clarifies Article 7 by stating that:
“While removal of de jure barriers is necessary, it is not sufficient. Where
countries have developed effective temporary strategies in an attempt to achieve
equality of participation, a wide range of measures has been implemented.. . .”120
The General Recommendation goes on to reiterate the Beijing Platform of
Action and the need to close the gap between de jure and de facto rights of
women in political participation.121 The General Recommendation states that
only “if women’s participation reaches 30 to 35 percent (generally termed a
“critical mass”) is there a real impact on political [life]”.122
Finally, United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325, passed
in 2000, “[u]rges Member States to ensure increased representation of women

114. ICCPR, supra note 113, at art. 25.
115. U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25
(Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote), The Right to Participate in Public Affairs,
Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ¶6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (July 12, 1996).
116. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties
under article 40 of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Concluding
observations of the Human Rights Committee: Bosnia and Herzegovina, ¶8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/BIH/CO/1 (Nov. 22, 2006).
117. G. A. Res. 34/180 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (Dec. 18, 1979).
118. Id. at art. 7.
119. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women:
Country Reports, U.N. WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2016).
120. Commission Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation No. 23, Women in Political and Public Life, U.N. Doc. A/52/38, 16th Sess.
[hereinafter “General Recommendation”] (1997).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions
and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.”123
This policy is further broadened in subsequent UNSC resolutions addressed in
the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, which calls for the increased
participation of women in the processes and institutions of peace building and
security.124
There is little empirical evidence revealing to what extent international
texts affirming women’s rights are incorporated and enforced as constitutional
guarantees at the national level. Lack of clarity in this realm may be incidental
to divisions in the literature on constitution-making more generally. Legal
scholars on constitution-making have largely gravitated towards one of two
poles: those who deem written constitutions as local creatures driven by the
interests and values of national actors on the one hand, and those who see
constitutions as amalgamations of external, transnational or international
constructs on the other.125 The former, sometimes referred to as national-identity
constitutionalism, views constitutions as texts that adopt unique identities
reflective of a nation’s past experiences.126 Constitution-making should thus be
primarily driven by locally-inspired political aspirations and commitments.127
From this perspective, the framing of certain rights provisions and the way they
interact with other substantive or structural/procedural provisions may differ
depending on the social, political, and geographic contexts in which they
emerged.128 While national identity and interests have historically been defined
by a country’s political elites,129 scholars have moreover raised the normative
claim that broad public participation stands as a barometer for the constitutionmaking process’s overall legitimacy, as well as a harbinger for the constitution’s
future effectiveness.130 Implicit within this claim is the idea that efforts to
include a cross-section of the population from various geographic,
socioeconomic, and ideological backgrounds reduces the risk of a top-down
imposition of constitutional norms.

123. S.C. Res. 1325, ¶ 1 (Oct 31, 2000).
N.,
124. See
generally
Women,
Peace
and
Security,
U.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/wps.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) (providing
a list of all United Nations Security Council resolutions on gender and peacekeeping work).
125. Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political
Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 3, 8-16
(Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2015).
126. See, e.g. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY, 70, 133 (2010)
(suggesting that constitutions are a reflection of norms, values and principles of a nation, and that the
constitutional identity should evolve with and emerge from changes in national identity).
127. Fredrick Schauer, On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 Conn. L. Rev. 907, 912
(2005).
128. See Galligan, supra note 125, at 11.
129. Tom Ginsburg et al., Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions
Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201 (2008).
130. Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 858-60 (2005).
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Alternatively, others describe constitution-making as an ongoing exercise
in constitutional diffusion.131 Countries either borrow from foreign constitutions
or draw from international templates intended to mainstream human rights
language and propel a transnational movement of human rights norms.132
Countries may choose to incorporate international human rights provisions as a
way to gain clout and reputational benefits at the international level. Others see
incorporation through the lens of soft coercion: a state’s more powerful allies
may try to condition the terms of their relations or the provision of foreign aid
on the enactment of certain provisions.133 Ideational theory argues that ideas are
intrinsically influential,134 that their acceptance at the international level changes
state behavior over time through modes of persuasion.135 Observing constitutionmaking processes can provide insights into how and to what degree
transnational norms are infused in the final text. For example, the involvement
of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), foreign NGOs and
development or rule of law consultants may be evidence of diffusion.136
Our research in Tunisia showcases the value of using both domestic and
international texts to fortify constitutional rights guarantees. There has been a
recent call to adopt a dualistic approach that observes both national and
international influences at once.137 In “intermestic constitutionalism,” one would
recognize both transnational and local processes.138 For example, South Africa’s
1996 constitution, often touted as a model constitution for post-conflict
countries, is a product of both international and national influences. South
African scholar Heinz Klug has asserted that “a thin, yet significant international
political culture” propelled the country towards a Western constitutional model
in spite of its history of imperialism and apartheid, and that this resulted in the
incorporation of treaty texts such as CEDAW, primarily in order to acquire
international esteem.139 Yet South Africa’s preamble, which drives the object
and purpose of the rest of the text, implicitly recognizes apartheid by noting the

131. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 VA. J.
INT’L L. 985 (2009) (describing how aspects of local law, like the separation of powers, will have to
accommodate the increasing globalization of constitutional processes).
132. GROTE, supra note 3, at 672-73; see also David Kennedy, The International Human
Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101 (2002) (exploring the potential
harms of the international human rights movement).
133. Goderis, supra note 7, at 4.
134. Ran Hirschl, The Strategic Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 158, 158-61 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2015).
135. Beth A. Simmons et al., Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism, 60 INT’L
ORG. 781, 795-99 (2006).
136. Cope, supra note 14, at 678 (noting that the efficacy of such consultants is largely
unknown, though organizations “often make a point of publicly trumpeting their efforts and
successes, sometimes claiming partial credit for the adoption of certain rights”).
137. GROTE, supra note 3, at 683.
138. Id.
139. HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA’S
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 7 (2000).
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“injustices of our past” and honoring “those who suffered for justice and
freedom in our land.”140 Likewise, a recent case study by Cope on constitutionmaking in Sudan suggests that rights provisions are largely driven by
international actors, while structural/institutional elements of the constitution are
more tightly controlled by local actors.141 Whether this exact combination of
transnational and local elements is the most effective for guaranteeing gender
rights for countries in transition is debatable.
Nevertheless, there is value in recognizing that constitution-making
processes may result in a confluence of local and international influences. The
legitimacy of the final text may depend on striking an appropriate balance
between the two and recognizing the ways in which they emerge. We see benefit
in incorporating international human rights standards for women in rights
provisions. We also encourage drawing on international or foreign law to guide
administrative and judicial interpretations of the gender rights provisions when
there are conflicts between them and other constitutional guarantees. External
examples can also guide legislatures in adopting laws that integrate women’s
rights standards with local context. The comprehensive guarantees of women’s
human rights set out in international and regional law only become real when
they are embraced—and made actionable—at the national level. This may only
occur if international law is adapted to a people’s values, histories, memories,
and blueprints for nation building.
Tunisia’s constitution, while hailed as a product of national interests and
broad grassroots engagement, still garnered much international attention and
received the benefits of much international expertise. The degree to which both
domestic and international influences played a role in drafting in constitutional
guarantees for women’s rights is rather unclear. The next section thus will dive
deeper into Tunisia’s process, looking at the stakeholders involved in
constitution-making and the specific gender-specific provisions at issue.
PART II
A. A Participatory Constitutional Process
Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly was elected on October 23, 2011
and was dissolved on January 26, 2014 when the new Constitution was
promulgated.142 It took two years, three months and three days for the NCA to
complete and pass a new constitution, though three draft texts were issued along
the way. Drafting began on January 14, 2012, and a first draft of the
Constitution was made available on August 13, 2012. The second draft was
released on December 14, 2012. On April 22, 2013, a third draft of the
constitution was introduced. The fourth draft followed shortly after, on June 1,

140.
141.
142.

S. AFR. CONST., 1996, preamble.
Cope, supra note 14, at 723-24.
THE CARTER CENTER, supra note 37, at 34-42.
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2013.143 After an intense period of debate and subsequent amendment, the final
text was passed by an assembly vote on January 27, 2014.144
Although some have criticized the process as unnecessarily prolonged,145
NCA members have justified the span of time in terms of the process that it
followed.146 The Assembly took significant steps to introduce each draft to
stakeholders in civil society for their input. In the beginning, the constitutionmaking process was the all-consuming interest of the Tunisian people. One
young activist noted, “Before the revolution, café conversations centered around
TV shows and football. For months after the revolution it was all politics–you
couldn’t escape it. But the excitement didn’t last–of course there was a lot of
discussion, but the process took so long that it inevitably led to a degree of
apathy if not exasperation.”147
As much as possible, debates were also carried out in full transparency. The
plenary sessions were formally open to the public,148 and each constitutional
draft was subject to public consultation and over two thousand town hall
meetings. 149 While drafting committees invited local experts to contribute to
each issue of discussion, each discussion was followed by a release of compiled
notes and proposed amendments and made available to the public on the
assembly’s website.150 Individual members of the assembly coordinated tours of
cities and universities around Tunisia to discuss the process and obtain
feedback.151 Professor Salsabil Klibi, professor at La Faculté des Sciences
Juridiques stated: “Overall people put a lot of thought into the drafting process.
Though there were some problems, it was overall very complete.”152 One
academic at La Faculté de Sciences Juridiques was impressed with the constant
transfer of information, updates on the drafting process, and the ease of
navigation of the assembly’s website. The level of accessibility, however,
seemed to differ between the capital and more remote areas: “We weren’t able
to get a lot of participation from people in the southwest and the interior. There

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Tunisia Assembly Passes New Constitution, BBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25908340.
146. Interview with Hela Hammi, Ennahda party member (May 27, 2015).
147. Interview with Issrar Chamekh, Student and Tunisian activist (June 2, 2015).
148. THE CARTER CENTER, supra note 37, at 59.
149. Klibi, supra note 39.
150. Arshif Ashghal Almajlis Alwatani Alttasisi, MAJLIS NUWWAB ALSHAEB [ASSEMBLY OF
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE], http://www.anc.tn/site/main/AR/docs/archive_anc.jsp (last
visited, Oct. 26, 2016).
151. Altaqrir Aleamm hawl Mashruaa Aldustur, ALMAJLIS ALWATANI ALTTASISI [GENERAL
REPORT
ON
THE
DRAFT
CONSTITUTION]
(June
14,
2013),
U.N.
http://www.anc.tn/site/main/AR/docs/anc/rapport_general_const.pdf;
see
also
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL, A NEWSLETTER ON UNITED NATIONS CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT, Issue 2
Spring/Summer 2014, at 16.
152. Klibi, supra note 39.
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were efforts to engage with them, but it was for obvious reasons more
difficult.”153
The extent to which women in Tunisia proactively engaged in the
constitution-making process was unprecedented. Drafting safeguards for gender
equality in all circumstances became the rallying point for women on both ends
of the political spectrum.154 According to Hela Hammi, a deputy in Ennahda,
“there [were] a lot of political tensions among members of Parliament, but the
women worked more or less in tandem.”155 At the early stages of constitution
drafting, one of the members of Parliament organized a lunchtime meeting for
all of the female members to sit down and discuss what they perceived as
primary issues.156 Follow up discussions resulted, during which women deputies
wrote down their common concerns and proposals, which they then presented to
the greater assembly.157 A part of this process included transnational experts
from other countries, such as South Africa, who spoke to them about the role of
women in their own countries’ drafting process.158
Outside the political sphere, women were likewise eager to form broad
rights-based coalitions, particularly those who were already members of a larger
associational networks. For example, UGTT women leaders at the local and
regional level provided significant support to other newer women’s rights
efforts.159 These leaders leveraged the UGTT’s broad membership network to
push forward initiatives favorable to working class women and their social and
economic interests.160 Similarly, the ATFD was instrumental in bringing
together a cross-section of women’s organizations to push through revisions for
certain provisions including Article 21 on gender equality161, Article 34 on
political representation162, and Article 46163 on protections for women against all
forms of violence.164 The association’s galvanizing efforts during the drafting

153. Interview with masters candidate (names withheld by request of interviewee), La Faculté
de Sciences Juridiques de Tunis, in Tunis, Tunisia (May 26, 2015).
154. Id.
155. Hammi, supra note 146.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Interview with Habiba Mizoumi, National Secretary General for Dentists & Nurses for the
General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) (May 29, 2015); William Rogers, Tunisian Union
Nominated for Nobel Peace Prize, LEFT LABOR REPORTER (Apr. 21 2014),
https://leftlaborreporter.wordpress.com/tag/ugtt/. For more information on Mizoumi’s role in UGTT,
see Part III, infra.
160. Mizoumi, supra note 159.
161. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 21 (“All citizens, male and female,
have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the law without any discrimination.”).
162. Id. at art. 34 (“The rights to election, voting, and candidacy are guaranteed, in accordance
with the law. The state seeks to guarantee women’s representation in elected bodies.”).
163. Id. at art. 46 (“The state commits to protect women’s accrued rights and work to
strengthen and develop those rights.”).
164. Interview with Saida Rached, President of The Tunisian Association of Democratic
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process has allowed it to continue as a key actor in creating implementing
legislation to turn these guarantees into a reality.165 “We rely heavily on the
advice of experts and academics,” says ATFD’s current president Saida Rached,
emphasizing the importance of the association’s network in carrying out its
work. Having a pulse on all gender-related matters is also critical: “Our current
focus has been on political participation and gathering information about women
and rural labor, but we try to focus on all issues related to gender equality.”166
Yet coalitions by their very nature are prone to ideological and political
divides. In spite of the UGTT’s efforts to remain neutral, its continuous
involvement in politics at the national level inevitably made it susceptible to
political influences. Despite laudable movements early on, internal divisions
eventually emerged between local members and their national leadership over
the role UGTT should play moving forward.167 Some feared that the national
board, based in Tunis, had spent too much time accommodating political elites
and their business allies at the expense of advocating for greater employee’s
rights.168 There were also rumors of conflict between UGTT and other wellestablished organizations such as LTDH and the Bar Association. Although
ATFD’s internal divisions have not been as public, it too has received criticism
for being either too unwieldy or else too tied up in tackling certain ‘elite
feminist’ issues at the expense of issues facing the rural poor and middle class.169
Such divides within and among civil society groups inevitably hurt the ability of
women’s rights coalitions to achieve the aims they seek.
The UGTT and AFTD are among a handful of nationally recognized civil
society organizations in Tunisia that existed long before the revolution started.
While these groups were perhaps the most visible during the early stages of the
drafting process, a number of newer, youth-led organizations joined the
associative landscape to become effective mobilizers in their own right. These
organizations largely emerged as civil society watchdogs over the country’s
transition to a democratic state. Most notably, Al-Bawsala, a monitoring body
made up of young Tunisian activists and journalists, was one of the first
organizations to receive significant attention early on as a key player in
monitoring Tunisia’s constitution-making process and thereafter movements in
the national assembly regarding new policies and budget allocation.170 AlBawsala, which means “compass,” has become a distributor of information that

Women (ATFD) (May 29, 2015).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Hanane Zbiss, Tunisian Labor Union Faces Internal Rifts, AL-MONITOR (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/03/tunisia-labor-union-internal-rifts-jomaa.html#.
168. Chamekh, supra note 147. This is a reflection of the larger generational divide noted in
Parker, supra note 46.
169. KHALIL, supra note 3, at 54.
170. MONICA L. MARKS, BROOKINGS INST., CONVINCE, COERCE OR COMPROMISE:
ENNAHDA’S APPROACH TO TUNISIA’S CONSTITUTION 5 (2014); Chamekh, supra note 147.
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other civil society groups and grassroots movements have used to launch
parallel advocacy efforts.171
Civil society’s overall ability to influence the drafting process still largely
hinged on the strength of the relationships between the various demographics
within civil society and those in Tunisia’s inner political sphere. Though the
NCA was diligent about setting up websites with recordings of the debates, and
some deputies went so far as to organize village discussions, the effects of these
efforts varied. Many individuals, particularly youth, were disenchanted by the
process.172 One student from Thala173 felt that watching the debates only
contributed to his discontent and apathy: “It was too much politicking. It was
often frustrating to watch.”174 Others have noted that the effort to create
transparency through online streaming spurred conversation. “There are nightly
debates among commentators now,” noted one civil society volunteer from Sidi
Bouzid. “Newspapers still have their own political affiliations, but the
discussion on social media now is much more open and nuanced. Before there
was one paper and one TV show. It is so diverse now.”175 Even those frustrated
by the way in which the NCA structured the constitution-making process cannot
deny the role social media played in introducing a wide representation of views
on what the constitution’s rights provisions should be and how they should be
enforced. Online chat forums provide young women and men, especially those
outside the capital, with a means for indirect participating in definitions of
“equality” and the role of women in society.176
Despite a relatively participatory process, the sentiment among Tunisians
regarding the final text is mixed – many approve of the 2014 constitution but are
concerned about its implementation.177 A broad constituency of political activists
and civil society organizations (CSOs) supported by technical advisors is
necessary to help keep gender equality at the center of the new constitution,

171. AL-BAWSALA, http://www.albawsala.com (last visited Oct. 26, 2016); see also Sarah
Mersch, Tunisian NGO Fights for Political Transparency, DW NEWS (Dec 9, 2012),
http://www.dw.com/en/tunisian-ngo-fights-for-political-transparency/a-16235400 (explaining the
work that Al Bawsala does to monitor the Tunisian Government).
172. TUNIS AFRIQUE PRESSE, supra note 62.
173. Thala is a small rural municipality in Tunisia’s interior, not far from Sidi Bouzid, where
the revolution started, and Al-Kasserine, which has seen a spike in extremist activity in recent years.
Like Sidi Bouzid and Al-Kasserine, Thala was heavily suppressed under the Ben Ali regime and saw
high levels of unemployment, particularly among youth. For a brief summary of Thala and other
interior municipalities, see Rosa Moussaoui & Hassane Zerrouky, Tunisie La Source de la
Révolution, L’HUMANITE (Oct. 24 2011).
174. Interview with Thala Solidaire, Student and community organizer (May 24, 2015).
175. Interview with student and activist, Association Tunisienne pour l’Intégrité et la
Démocratie des Elections (June 2, 2015).
176. Id.
177. Margaret Williams & Youssef Mahmoud, The New Tunisian Constitution: Triumphs and
Potential
Pitfalls,
GLOBAL
OBSERVATORY
(Feb.
27,
2014),
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/02/the-new-tunisian-constitution-triumphs-and-potentialpitfalls/.
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through a policy framework and an agenda for action. Neila Chabaâne, the
former Minister of Women’s Affairs, has said that young Tunisian women, in
particular, seem at a loss as to how to apply the constitution’s ideological
provisions to realities on the ground.178 Though participation was relatively high
during the drafting process, civil society’s ability to participate in implementing
constitutional provisions remains an open question. Further, there is a fear that
certain groups, particularly reintegrated old regime elites, will dominate the
discussion to the exclusion of others.179
B. Drafting Gender Sensitive Provisions in the Constitution
Although the NCA conceived of the drafting of gender rights provisions as
an organized, transparent, dialogical process between assembly members and
civil society, the process became one much less formal and direct than designed.
The NCA tasked the Committee of Human Rights and Liberties, one of six
drafting committees, with shaping all rights provisions based on civil society
and foreign recommendations. As such, the committee was responsible for all
provisions that directly and indirectly touched on gender rights. Express
guarantees for women are included in Article 21 on gender equality, Article 34
on political guarantees for women, and Article 46 protecting women against all
forms of violence.180 Article 39 on the right to public education, Article 44 on
the right to water, and Article 40 on the right to work, are programmatic rights
that indirectly address a woman’s right to accessing basic human services.181 The
express women’s rights provisions will be considered in this section and the
next, and a discussion of the Constitution’s programmatic rights as they relate to
women will follow.
Throughout the drafting process, the Committee of Human Rights and
Liberties sought input from civil society representatives and relevant experts, as
well as women deputies within the NCA.182 Women deputies gathered together
early in the process for discussion lunches, where they would also invite those
from outside the political sphere.183 Despite this engagement, Salsabil Klibi
notes, “There could have been more time for collaboration. There were a few
‘open days’ where civil society organizations were invited to meet with drafters
at the assembly building, but the time was narrow.”184 There was in fact only one

178. Interview with Neila Chabaâne, former Minister of Women’s Affairs (May 27, 2015).
179. See generally Boubekeur, supra note 50 (analyzing the ways in which new and old elites
‘bargain’ for dominance in Tunisia’s new institutional framework).
180. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, arts. 21, 34, 46.
181. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, arts. 39, 44, 40.
182. NCA COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES REPORT, NOTES AND PROPOSALS
OF THE SHARED ORGANIZATION FOR COORDINATING AND DRAFTING TO THE COMMITTEE ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
AND
LIBERTIES
(in
Arabic),
http://www.anc.tn/site/main/AR/docs/rapport_final/rapport_final_5_2.pdf.
183. Hammi, supra note 146.
184. Klibi, supra note 39.
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open day for CSOs to speak directly with NCA members, held before the release
of the second draft.185 Some have suggested that invitations were limited to
CSOs already involved in the process and that, further, the assembly did not
have a channel for individuals or informal groups to submit draft proposals. A
number of those invited boycotted the open day in protest of its timing and
exclusivity.186
Regardless of whether the NCA took sufficient steps to formally include
civil society, many Tunisians informally engaged with the constitution-making
process through social media, the press, and local politics.187 The extent to which
Tunisia’s constitution would guarantee women’s rights was one of the most
widely debated issues outside the political sphere. One journalist described the
early drafting stages as a “national hunger” to participate in a popular debate
that had been silenced under Ben Ali.188 State feminism starting with Bourguiba
through Ben Ali had succeeded in suppressing popular debates over the
appropriate role of women in Tunisian society and relevant legal protections.189
Dictated policies of progressive feminism had created the false narrative that
women in Tunisia enjoyed equal rights with men and that the country had made
important advances compared to women in other parts of the Arab and Muslim
world.190 The 2011 Revolution unveiled a complex reality incongruent with
rights formally recognized by the prior regime.191 This disconnect, exacerbated
by deep ideological divides in the Tunisian political scene, complicated
discussions over whether the new constitution’s proper role should be to push
for universal gender norms or norms that reflect a competing type of feminism
“emphasizing religious freedoms and rights.”192 Unfortunately, the final draft
does not necessarily bring this debate to a clear resolution. Article 21 champions
gender equality in broad and general terms: men and women have “equal rights
and duties” and are “equal before the law” but the text fails to reach greater
specificity.193
The generality of the language in Article 21 is a product, first, of the lack of
transparency between the NCA and civil society stakeholders, and second, of the
prolonged popular disputes that came to define much of the constitution-making
process for provisions related to women’s rights. When the NCA released its
first draft on August 8, 2012, the article (then Article 28) included

185. Id.
186. Interview with Hiba, Law Student, in Thala, Tunisia (May 24, 2015).
187. Id.
188. Interview with Myriam Ben Ghazi, in Tunis, Tunisia (May 29, 2015).
189. BRAND, supra note 21, at 176.
190. Loes Debuysere, Antagonism and Agonism between Secular and Islamist Women’s Rights
Movements in Tunisia, 21 MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 2, 226, 235 (2016).
191. Id. at 226-27.
192. Jeremy Farrell, Tunisian Constitution: Text and Context, JADALIYYA, (Aug. 23, 2012),
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6991/tunisian-constitution_text-and-context.
193. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 21.
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complementarity (mutakamila) language as opposed to the equality (musawa)
language proposed by Nidaa-Tounis and left-leaning CSOs. Those internal to
the process described the insertion of complementarity as a soft proposal by one
of the members of Ennahda.194 Some deputies insisted that the language issued
in the first draft was either a “naïve misstep”195 resulting from a rushed drafting
process or a mistranslation taken out of context.196 The opposition nevertheless
contended that even the suggestion of complementary status posed a threat to
freedoms formally secured in the CSP and joined hands with CSOs to change
the language to equality (musawa).197 As a part of their campaign, activists
upheld the CSP as precedent that could not be reversed. The march onto
Bourguiba Street on Tunisian Women’s Day was in fact a nod to Bourguiba
himself, who established the holiday to commemorate the CSP and its
advancements.198 Although his efforts were influenced primarily by his desire to
gain international favor among Western powers, women’s rights activists have
nevertheless heralded the CSP for both its significance and ongoing influence.199
The selective referencing of Tunisia’s past in order to legitimize certain
values over others became part of a larger popular struggle to control not only
the language of the constitution, but also the political narrative surrounding it.200
Pro-Bourguiba rhetoric was perhaps more a reflection of popular conceptions of
women’s rights during the drafting process than an accurate understanding of
women’s rights as applied under the Bourguiba regime. Many individuals who
participated in the August 13 march on Bourguiba Street did not in fact
champion Bourguiba or his policies, but rather represented a mix of political and
religious viewpoints. As Hadia Bilhajj, CAWTAR Director stated, “[i]t wasn’t
one strand of civil society or one opposition party. There were men and women,
a diverse range of NGOs and other civil society organizations – not just secular
groups pushing a certain narrative of women’s rights.”201 Likewise, though the
complementary language proposal came from members of Ennahda, not all
Ennahda members were in support. Regarding the initial proposal, Hela Hammi
member of the Ennahda party, commented: “We knew from the beginning that
complementarity language would be abused in Tunisia. France has
complementarity language but the text in its constitution implies that there is
submission on both sides – there was a valid fear that men in Tunisia would

194. Hammi, supra note 146.
195. MARKS, supra note 170, at 23.
196. Monica Marks, “Complementary” Status for Tunisian Women, FOREIGN POLICY, (Aug.
20, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/20/complementary-status-for-tunisian-women/.
197. See discussion supra Part I, Overview of Women’s Engagement in Tunisia’s Constitution
Making Process.
198. Tunisian Women Rally to Preserve Gender Equality, AL-ARABIYA, (Aug. 13, 2011),
https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/13/162169.html.
199. See discussion supra Part I.
200. Debuysere, supra note 190, at 229-33.
201. Interview with Hadia Bilhaji, in Tunis, Tunis. (June 3, 2015).
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interpret complementarity to mean only the submission of women.”202
Nevertheless, some secularist feminist discourses sought to paint Ennahda with
one brush as a misogynist party with patriarchal motivations.203 To that effect,
these groups released speculative and unofficial versions of the drafted provision
before the August 13 march to garner greater opposition to Ennahda control.204
Ennahda then responded by launching a counter campaign and march on August
13, also on Bourguiba Street, that highlighted positive statements made by the
then President Rachid Ghannouchi. Though activists eventually succeeded in
removing complementary language from the final draft, it is evident that control
over the text’s “legislative history” became as important to the debate as the text
itself.
Similar to its efforts surrounding Article 21, elements of civil society
pushed for more actionable language under Article 46. The Article states that
“[t]he State shall commit to protecting women’s achieved rights and seek to
support and develop them.”205 In addition, it reaffirms equal opportunity
between men and women in “all various responsibilities in all fields,” and
guarantees that the state “will take necessary measures to eliminate violence
against women.”206 Secular groups feared that without this provision and its
enforcement clause, Islamists would alter, if not remove the CSP as source of
law. However, Ennahda’s ultimate support for the addition during the final vote
in January 2014 seems to convey the party leadership’s intent to at least
maintain protections provided under the CSP.
Ennahda’s leadership in bringing about the final versions of Articles 21 and
46 should not go without mention. Achieving a guarantee of gender equality,
without exceptions, was among the most heralded accomplishments of the final
text. A large part of the battle for Ennahda as the controlling party was to
overcome disagreements and possible misunderstandings to reach a general
spirit of collaboration. The multiplication of civil society interests in 2011 and
onward meant that consensus on all sides would be crucial to passing a women’s
rights provision championing equality and parity. “Under the Ennahda
government, Islamists opened a new path for women’s rights,” says Dr. Khedija
Arfaoui from University of Tunis.207
While Dr. Arfaoui’s statement is put to question in the next section,
Ennahda, for all of its faults, led a constitution-making process marked by
greater consensus and public input than that of other transition states in the
region. Egypt’s drafting process in 2012 offers the most relevant comparison.

202. Id.
203. MARKS, supra note 170, at 22-23; see also Monica Marks, Can Islamism and Feminism
Mix?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/opinion/can-islamism-andfeminism-mix.html?_r=0.
204. Hammi, supra note 146.
205. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 46.
206
Id.
207. Interview with Khedija Arfaoui, in Beirut, Leb. (June 10, 2015).
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While both Ennahda and its ruling counterpart in Egypt, the Muslim
Brotherhood, had to reconcile Islamist interests and the interests of secular or
left-leaning parties, the process in Egypt suffered from relative lack of public
participation and input.208 Egypt’s 2012 Constitution reflected more of a political
compromise among parties than a response to calls from women’s rights
advocates. While the text outlawed violence against women, including the
practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), it provided only tepid support for
other forms of women’s rights.209 It has in effect taken a step back from some of
the gender rights embedded in the 1971 text. As noted by former Egyptian
Minister Moushira Khattab, the new Egyptian Constitution places “women
under the constitutional chapter on moral foundations instead of rights and
freedoms.”210 In terms of political participation rights, the 2014 Constitution
does not include the 64-seat quota established in 1971 and merely promises to
take measures to guarantee women “appropriate representation” in elected
councils.211
Analysts have considered several theories as to why the drafting processes
in Egypt and Tunisia brought forth such divergent results, particularly given that
both constitutions were produced by an elected constituent assembly that made
room for some level of public participation. Some suggest that while Islamists in
both countries held the most seats in their constituent assemblies, the Muslim
Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was ultimately much
less willing to compromise on the gender rights provisions than Tunisia’s
Ennahda party during drafting negotiations.212 Conversely, Ennahda espoused a
platform of moderate Islamism that lent itself to concessions early on. There is
some reason to believe that a simple majority win for the FJP allowed for its
intransigence, while the Ennahda’s plurality win, though significant, exposed the
party to strong counter-coalitions.213 Others suggest that the difference was in
starting points: while Tunisia opted for a blank slate, Egypt worked off of its

208. Darin E.W. Johnson, Beyond Constituent Assemblies and Referenda: Assessing the
Legitimacy of the Arab Spring Constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007,
1055 (2015).
209
For example, Article 33 in the 2012 Constitution does not affirmatively recognize gender
equality, but rather pledges equality for all citizens. Such broad wording leaves the definition and
scope of ‘equality’ unclear. See David Lunde, If You Want to Know Whether Islam & Democracy
Are Compatible, Look to Egypt & Tunisia, MUFTAH, May 1, 2015, http://muftah.org/islamdemocracy-egypt-tunisia/.
210. Moushira Khattab, EGYPT’S POST-REVOLUTION CONSTITUTIONS: RELIGION VERSUS
HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (March 14, 2014) (unpublished).
211. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, as amended, Jan. 18, 2014, art.11, pg.
7-8. (“The State shall take the necessary measures to ensure the appropriate representation of women
in the houses of representatives, as specified by Law. The State shall also guarantee women’s right
of holding public and senior management offices in the State and their appointment in judicial
bodies and authorities without discrimination.”).
212. Zaid Al-Ali & Donia Ben Romdhane, Tunisia’s New Constitution: Progress and
Challenges to Come, OPENDEMOCRACY, (Feb. 16, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/arabawakening/zaid-al-ali-donia-ben-romdhane/tunisia’s-new-constitution-progress-and-challenges-to-.
213. Hammi, supra note 146.
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1971 constitution’s text.214 One factor that deserves greater consideration,
however, is how Tunisia’s constitution-making framework incorporated
mechanisms for ongoing public engagement and further, public accountability.
Participation from outside the political sphere was not restricted to online
comments or a final up-down referendum vote215—rather, input from watchdog
organizations and grassroots coalitions became an integral part of the drafting
process.
In summary, the drafting process became less about the text itself than
about surrounding discourses and the competing narratives that shaped women’s
rights in Tunisia post-revolution. Constitution-making became an opportunity
for political and civil society stakeholders to address deep-seated issues long
suppressed under Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Starting with a tabula rasa as opposed
to an older constitutional text encouraged individuals to assert their personal
conceptions of women’s rights more vigorously, resulting in greater
transparency on every side of the debate. Ennahda, though not without its
weaknesses and challenges, should be commended for its willingness to foster
such debate and compromise with its more progressive counterparts early on. An
inability to reach greater consensus, however, has led to a text that supports
gender equality in broad terms but leaves room for gaps in both enforcement and
implementation.
C. Reconciling Islam and Human Rights in the Constitution
As noted in the previous section, Article 21 guarantees men and women
“equal rights and duties” and equality “before the law” but fails to reach greater
specificity or include clear enforcement provisions.216 Critics of Ennahda
suggest that the ruling party permitted such ambiguity to erode women’s
rights.217 Others argue that ambiguity was not so much an intentional result as a
reflection of Ennahda’s internal struggle to place moderate Islamist principles
within a historically secular framework.218 Regardless of its intended purpose,
however, an ambiguous provision on gender equality would have perpetuated
214. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES IN EGYPT AND
TUNISIA – LESSONS LEARNT – OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION IN LIBYA. EUROP.
PARL.
REP.
PE
433.840
(2014),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/433840/EXPOAFET_NT(2014)433840_EN.pdf.
215. Tamir Moustafa, Drafting Egypt’s Constitution: Can a New Legal Framework Revive A
Flawed Transition?, BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER-STANFORD PAPER 1, 11 (2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/12-egypt-constitutionmoustafa/new1-drafting-egypts-new-constitutionenr03.pdf.
216. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 21.
217. Student and activist, supra note 175.
218. Edward Cody, Tunisia Faces Political Struggle over Islam, WASH. POST, Jun. 16, 2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tunisia-faces-political-struggle-overislam/2013/06/16/1000670a-cdef-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html; see also Shadi Hamid,
Tunisia Field Report: The Islamist Balancing Act, MARKAZ (Feb. 12, 2015),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/02/12-tunisia-islamists-ennahda-hamid.
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the struggle to constitutionally define the role of women in Tunisia, as well as
conflicting de jure and de facto realities.
This tension between what is law and what is practiced is particularly
visible with the hijab. Prior to the revolution, women were banned from wearing
the hijab or headscarves in all state institutions including universities, hospitals,
and public administrations. Thus, many women after the revolution asserted
their right to independent expression by wearing the hijab or niqab. Some
Ennahda members went so far as to endorse student protests at Manouba
University, among others,219 that called for the right to wear a hijab or niqab in
all public settings. Conversely, women who did not cover their face or hair
feared that though Ennahda’s leadership championed women’s rights and
freedom of expression in broad terms, its policy while in power would be to
shift towards enforcing such freedoms selectively.220 Indeed, Arfaoui notes that
the revolution sparked for the first time in Tunisia’s history “a wave of abuses of
women without a covering” that then fueled not only a general sense of
insecurity, but also a greater concern that if Ennahda did not impose its religious
preferences by law, it would find opportunities to permit imposition by popular
might.221
A journalist and young Tunisian women’s rights activist notes that
inconsistencies between what is law and what is practiced will persist if rights
are only acknowledged in the text and not more: “Tunisia fascinates people
because it is a paradox when it comes to gender equality. And it has always been
this way.”222 Some attribute this to ambiguities in Tunisia’s constitution citing to
Islam and its role in Tunisia’s political system and culture. One scholar has
noted that when Bourguiba gave credence to women’s rights under the CSP, he
was “careful to locate these changes . . . within the framework, not of dismissing
religion, but of a modernist reading of Islam.”223 By contrast, the constitution of
1959 recognizes Islam as the official religion of Tunisia, but does not constrict
Islam to any one practice or interpretation.224 Neither text, in effect, fully
reconciles Islam with more ‘modern’ societal values. Hadia Bilhajj emphasizes
the importance of acknowledging Tunisia’s Islamic heritage as significant, while
also acknowledging the tension it creates with modernist notions of human
rights: “Tunisia, like its neighbors Algeria and Morocco, must work in
contradictions. It is an Arab, Islamic state subject to a long period of colonial
occupation. Some think this has to be a decision between secularism and

219. See Loic de Pape, Peut on convertir un epace? Le cas des mobilizations ‘salafistes’ a
l’universite de La Manouba (Tunis), CAHIERS D’ÉTUDES DU RELIGIUX, 16-23 (2014)
https://cerri.revues.org/1397; see also Fatime El-Issawi, Islamists of Tunisia Reconciling National
Contradiction, LSE BLOG, (Apr. 13, 2012), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2012/04/islamists-of-tunisiareconciling-national-contradictions/.
220. Arfaoui, supra note 207.
221. Id.
222. Ben Ghazi, supra note 188.
223. BRAND, supra note 21, at 178.
224
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Islamism, but our situation is much more complex than that.”225 A tendency to
oversimplify views of Islam and women’s rights in Tunisia is perhaps a product
of top-down policies under Bourguiba that then carried over to Ben Ali: “[Ben
Ali] manipulated women’s rights as a tool to accrue international favor, with
little if any internal application,” says Hadia Bilhajj, “All women’s associations
at that time were headed by Ben Ali’s wife, who propped up Tunisia as a false
paragon of women’s rights.”226 Such obvious statism created some semblance of
a women’s national machinery that formally aligned with UN mandates and
acquired praise from the international community but had little impact on the
actual status of Tunisian women. To ensure a uniformly progressive image of
women’s rights, alternative viewpoints were either watered down or heavily
suppressed.
The constitution-making process was thus driven by a desire to replace a
state-defined culture of rights with a text reflecting broad consensus between
“values of Islam and values of modernity.”227 NCA members sought to create a
constitution that would satisfy and respect all visions of women’s rights in
Tunisian society. What resulted, however, was a patchwork of provisions that
fail to fully reconcile all stakeholders’ interests. Most notably, the Tunisian
constitution’s preamble expresses both a “commitment to teachings of Islam”
and to “the principals of universal human rights,” without clarifying the nature
of the relationship between these two sources.228 Although these commitments
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, there is significant confusion over how
they should be considered, independently and collectively, during the early
phases of implementation. Similar confusion emerges when we look at Article 1
and its assertion that “Tunisia is a free. . .sovereign state” and “Islam is its
religion,” compared to the assertion in Article 2 that the state is based on “the
will of the people, and the supremacy of law.”229 In regards to “Islam is its
religion,” it is not clear to what “it” refers. Is “it” Tunisia as a society, or the
political nature of its government? If the intent is the latter, then Article 2
declaring Tunisia as a “civil state” creates a contradiction that the constitutional
court, once established, must address. This contradiction is exacerbated by the
last sentence in Article 1 stating, “this article cannot be amended,” and Article
146, which requires that “the Constitution’s provisions shall be interpreted as a
harmonious whole.”230
Even within Ennahda there was much debate during the drafting process
over the interpretation of Islamic texts and their various applications to Tunisian

225. Bilhaji, supra note 201.
226. Id.
227. Robert Joyce, Leader Says Ennadha to Steer Clear of Presidential Race, TUNISALIVE,
(Feb. 27, 2014) http://www.tunisia-live.net/2014/02/27/leader-says-ennahdha-to-steer-clear-ofpresidential-race/.
228. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, Preamble.
229. Id. at arts. 1-2.
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law. One of the party’s greatest challenges was—and still is—to define women’s
rights within an Islamic framework.231 While Ennahda held itself out as a
moderate Islamist coalition resting on a unified platform, its members and
supporters represented a broad spectrum of perspectives on the rights of
women.232 This led to disagreements around what the scope and definition of the
rights of women should be at the constitutional level. Conservative streams
pushed for clear, separated gender roles in line with individual interpretations of
sharia law, in some cases including a return to polygamy or a repeal of national
abortion laws.233 Hela Hammi, a deputy of Ennahda in the current government,
remarked that her “feminist beliefs” are not universally encouraged by her
colleagues, and that differences stem from cultural, not religious stigmas: “There
is a societal norm in Tunisia that men come home and read the paper and
women cook, clean, and take care of the home – there is nothing in the Qur’an
or in the Sunna delegating these roles.”234 During the drafting process she
pushed conservative members to scrutinize Tunisia’s patriarchal structures as
independent from values of Islam and not to be tolerated, let alone validated, by
the country’s future legal system.
In the discourse over women’s rights and Islam there is no single, uniform
perspective.235 The revolution, its aftermath, and the constitution-making process
reveal divergent views extant within Tunisia’s Muslim community about the
role of women in Tunisian society. A cross-cultural dialogue between the
Islamic community and the international human rights community is important
for a shared basis for human rights and towards advancing the legitimacy of
universal human rights norms to local communities that are defined by religious
affiliation. Religious communities in Tunisia are internally contested,
heterogeneous, and constantly evolving through internal debate and interaction,
and women are demanding change within their religious communities in order to
bring their faith in line with democratic norms and practices.236 Cross-cultural,
cross-gender, and cross-class dialogue is critical to resolving conflicts within
Islam as well as between Islam and human rights. Such dialogue also triggers
discussions on controversial issues implicating Islamic values and human rights
norms and dispels notions that there is one absolute or final notion of Islam or
that any one person can claim to have the one true teaching. This allows women
activists to articulate a Muslim feminist jurisprudential basis that is consistent
with gender equality.
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Ennahda, within the political sphere, has appropriated a modern face of
Islam but continues to struggle internally in defining what this stance will
entail.237 Apart from Ennahda is the rise of Salafist groups, both quietist—those
who do not participate in politics or warfare—and activist, with each faction
holding to a different vision of gender roles in Tunisian society.238 Men and
women alike vigorously defend these groups. In fact, there are indications in
recent years that women, particularly those who come from impoverished
circumstances or have been underserved by the state, have been drawn to these
groups’ ideologies and practices as an alternate form of security.239 Going
forward, the role of Salafism in Tunisian society cannot be ignored and requires
further attention.
D. Freedom from Violence as a Constitutional Right
The remainder of this section will take a look at how a guarantee of gender
equality in the constitution applies to other guarantees for women, namely,
protection against violence, political guarantees, and programmatic rights. The
Tunisian Constitution under Article 46 outlaws violence against women and
assures that “the State shall take the necessary measures to eradicate violence
against women.”240 Although Article 46 recognizes national security not just in
the context of border security and armed forces, but also as security at home and
in the streets, inconsistencies in the law prevent the state from further
considering the latter.
Several existing national laws are in indirect conflict with the new
constitution’s commitment to end violence against women in all its forms. For
example, men are legally recognized as the head of the household, which as one
Tunisian analyst noted “only works to reinforce economic and social patriarchal
structures.”241 Civil society groups are also urging for changes to the penal code,
which, similar to laws in other Arab countries, does not explicitly acknowledge
marital rape and grants a man convicted with rape the option to marry his victim
with the benefit of dropping charges.242 In terms of economic violence, labor

237. Francesco Cavatorta & Fabio Merone, Post-Islamism, Ideological Evolution and ‘La
Tunisianité’ of the Tunisian Islamist Party al-Nahda, 20 J. POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, 27, 28 (Apr. 17,
2015).
238. Elham Alkasimi, Tunisian Identity & Fears of Salafism, MUFTAH (June 20, 2013),
http://muftah.org/tunisian-identity-fears-of-salafism/#.Vc8phVNViko.
239. Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi Challenge, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/Tu
nisia/137-tunisia-violence-and-the-salafi-challenge.pdf; see also Dorthe Engelcke, Lecture, Party
Identification in Post-revolutionary Tunis: Nida Tunis and Ennahda Compared, U. OXFORD (Oct.
27, 2014), https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/party-identification-post-revolutionary-tunisia-nida-tunis-andennahda-compared.
240. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 46.
241. Interview with Jeunesse Tunisie, Unité EUROMED conference participant, in Tunis,
Tunis. (May 29, 2015).
242. Id.
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laws make room for gender wage disparity and have historically failed to protect
female agricultural workers from substandard working conditions and abusive
contractual relationships.243 The Secretary of State for Women Affairs is
collaborating with NGOs to harmonize the existing legal framework with
constitutional provisions, but such efforts will need cross-sector and horizontal
support across ministries to be effective.
To date the law on violence against women remains a draft law. Though
still in draft form, many seem hopeful that the law will pass. “Civil society
efforts and support from international organizations are strong,” says Neila
Chaâbane, one of the key drafters of the law during her time as Minister of
Women.244 A national survey conducted in 2010 showed that 47 percent of
women in Tunisia had faced at least one form of violence, a daunting number
given that women make up 52 percent of the population.245 Yet, increasing
extremist violence, such as the attack on the Badaro Museum, the resort attack
in Sousse, and the bus bombing in central Tunis, has turned the focus away from
social forms of violence towards greater security in the militaristic or police
force sense.246 A greater police presence to “fight terrorism” does not in any way
guarantee a decrease in sexual or physical violence against women. Unearthed
accounts of police violence against women under Ben Ali as well as numerous
cases of rape by police during the protests in 2011 are further evidence of this.247
Efforts to draft an anti-violence against women law were present even
before the revolution. “It was one of the issues that the Ben Ali regime
selectively chose to support.”248 The draft law, however, is an effort to create a
legal framework that is comprehensive.249 It addresses all forms of violence,
including physical, psychological, economic, and inter-family.250 Some of its
provisions include a formalized framework for victims to prosecute perpetrators
and state protection for those who seek justice.251 Efforts such as the

243. Infra note 273, at 40, 64.
244. Chabaâne, supra note 178.
245. Press Release, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, Sexual
Violence in Tunisia: From Denial to Dawning Recognition (June 2, 2014),
https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/north-africa-middleeast/tunisia/15425-sexual-violence-in-tunisia-from-denial-to-dawning-recognition.
246. Sara Hashash, Deadly Attacks Risk Casting a Shadow on Human Rights in Tunisia,
AMNESTY INT’L, (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/11/deadly-attacksrisk-casting-a-shadow-over-human-rights-in-tunisia/.
247. Eileen Byrne, Tunisians Protest Over Charges Against Woman Allegedly Raped by
Police, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 3, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/03/tunisiansprotest-charges-woman-police; Carlotta Gall, Women in Tunisia Tell of Decades of Police Cruelty,
Violence
and
Rape,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
28,
2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/29/world/africa/women-in-tunisia-tell-of-decades-of-policecruelty-violence-and-rape.html.
248. Mnasri, supra note 58.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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establishment of victim shelters and a stable, advertised hotline will be expanded
and supported by the state.252 “The biggest challenge has been to convince
certain members of society, of the assembly, that this issue is relevant,” notes
Chaâbane. “Unfortunately, public officials at the top are removed and thus
create a lot of push back. But judges in penal courts recognize this law as
necessary.”253
Lobbying efforts have sought to reframe violence against women as an
economic cost in order to appeal to parties who would normally not lend
support.254 Studies guided by the Ministry of Women have quantified the
negative impact of violence in terms of a woman’s ability to enter the labor
force and be an active participant in family and society.255 Groups actively
involved in the passage of the law are concerned, however, that civil society
initiatives are fractured and not unified.256 Some feel that while the law provides
access to justice for survivors of violence and free access to medical care for
victims, it does not go far enough in providing shelters and legal aid.257 On the
other hand, Tunisia’s willingness to define domestic violence as a public crime
and enshrine it in the supreme law of the land sends an important message both
nationally and globally. Moreover, the Tunisian provision defines domestic
violence against a woman as a crime against the personal security of the
woman.258
E. Political Rights
Another focus has been on fixing parliamentary and election laws, with a
particular emphasis on increasing women’s participation at the local level. Wellestablished civil society groups are involved in reforming the electoral law to
mandate horizontal as well as vertical parity. The ATFD and groups like League
of Tunisian Women Voters (LET) are particularly concerned with how parity
laws steer political elections, arguing that what is currently in place is either
ineffective or does not go far enough.259 Both Articles 34 and 46 in the
constitution provide certain political guarantees for women, including quotas in
government offices.260 While Article 34 upholds a general commitment to
252. Id.
253. Chabaâne, supra note 178.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Nessryne Jelalia, Still a Long Way to Equality for Tunisian Women, AL-ARABY (Jan. 14,
2015),
http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/1/14/still-a-long-way-to-equality-fortunisian-women.
258. It is interesting to contrast Tunisia’s individualistic conception of protection against
domestic violence from the conception conveyed in relevant provision in the Colombian
Constitution, which frames domestic violence as a crime destructive of the “harmony” and “unity”
of the family. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 42.
259. Interview with Kelthoum Kennou, President of LET, in Thala, Tunis. (May 24, 2015).
260. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 34 (“The State seeks to guarantee
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guarantee women representation in elected councils, Article 46 specifically
creates a state obligation to achieve gender parity, creating a strong
constitutional foundation for legislation to increase women’s political
participation at the national, regional and local levels.261
In an attempt to embody political gender equality in principle, elections
lists during the 2011 election of the constituent assembly were “vertically
zippered” such that every second candidate on each list was supposed to be a
woman.262 Some hailed this rule as a good first step: women composed over 25
percent (57 out of 217 seats) of the national assembly post-2011 and in the 2014
elections, which mandated similar rules, women voter turnout was marginally
higher than that in 2011, even while the youth turnout took a significant dive.263
Yet, some women’s activists argue these rules do not fully embrace the
guarantees provided in the constitution, noting that many of the women elected
were already plugged into the political system or else used as spot-fillers with
little opportunity to contribute as representatives of their electors.264
Furthermore, male candidates headed the vast majority of the lists submitted.
Critics of the current election rules have thus made a push for horizontal
zippering on top of vertical zippering in the next election.265 Critics also believe
that in order to increase public support given to women who seek political
office, there must be greater solidarity among women in local municipalities and
heightened political awareness among young women nationally.266
F. Programmatic Rights in the Tunisian Constitution:
The Tunisian Constitution enshrines both negative and positive rights, or
civil and political and economic and social rights. Economic and social rights, or
programmatic rights, are sometimes referred to as second-generation rights that
demand additional resources for the fulfillment of these rights. Constitutions are
no longer limited to restraining the exercise of power; they deal with the
women’s representation in elected councils”); art. 36 (“The State shall seek equal representation for
women and men in elected councils.”)
261. Id.
262. PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY, TUNISIA’S PARLIAMENTARY & GENERAL
ELECTIONS GUIDE 25-26 (Oct. 2014), http://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TunisiaElection-Guide-2014.pdf.
263. Id.
264. Interview with Alia Alyouta Benkefi, in Thala, Tunis. (May 24, 2015).
265. Id.
266. It is instructive to examine other laws in light of the Tunisian Constitution. The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes several women’s rights clauses including affirmative action
programs designed to ameliorate a legacy of discrimination against women. The Colombian
Constitution of 1991 also “grants a broad array of rights to women—articles 13 (equality), 40
(political participation), 42 (women’s status in the family), 43 (equal rights, non-discrimination,
protection of pregnant women, and special support to female heads of households), 53 (workplace
protection for women and mothers), 96 (citizenship based on mothers), and 323 (women as
alderwomen).” See Laura E. Lucas, Does Gender Specificity in Constitutions Matter? 20 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 133, 143 (2009).
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redistribution of power. While negative rights curtail the power of government,
prohibiting or limiting the exercise of governmental power, positive or
programmatic rights call upon the government to provide resources, services,
and programs for their fulfillment. Substantive rights encompass positive
programs to fulfill those rights and address inequality. However, without
mechanisms and procedures for the actualization of these rights, they remain
largely limited to the realm of rhetoric. In 2004, when National Women
Outreach on Constitutional Reform in Nigeria made a set of recommendations to
make the constitution more women-friendly, it called for the justiciability of
current constitutional socio-economic rights.
Tunisia is a party to the ICESCR, and the Tunisian Constitution has
included social and economic rights in the Constitution.267 These rights include
the right to health, right to water, and right to education.268 These programmatic
rights, although inextricably linked to civil and political rights, are not directly
enforceable in the way civil and political rights are, but must await
implementation through legislative or executive action and through budgetary
appropriations.
Social guarantees with respect to matters such as education can be defined
as women’s rights. Article 44(1) of the Sudanese Constitution asserts that
“[e]ducation is a right for every citizen and that the State shall provide access to
education without discrimination as to . . . gender . . .” Alternatively, Article 39
of the Tunisian Constitution mandates education until the age of sixteen and
makes free public education a right “at all stages,” but does not specify
gender.269 This provision, if implemented properly, can have a powerful impact
on young women and can help combat early marriage. Mandating education for
all children, including the girl child, can be a powerful vaccine against early
marriage and is a cardinal and non-negotiable human right for girls and women.
Article 44 of Tunisia’s constitution similarly guarantees the right to water
and is one of the first constitutions in the world to do so.270 Article 44 further
requires the state to implement government policies that promote conservation
and rational use in order to protect this right.271 This is especially important for
marginalized women in rural areas or women laborers in the agricultural sector.
Recent water shortages have sparked debate over exactly how this right can be
implemented, such that rational use also results in equal distribution.272
Proposals include convertible energy initiatives, alternative methods of farming,
267. See Part III: Supremacy of International Law.
268. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, arts. 38, 39, 44.
269. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 39.
270. South Africa was the first country to include water rights within its constitution in 2004.
See John Scanlon, Angela Cassar & Noemi Nemes, Water as a Human Right? 9 (IUCN
Environmental Policy and Law Working Paper No. 51, 2004) (stating that, at the time, only the
South African Bill of Rights “enshrines [in a constitution] an explicit right of access to sufficient
water”).
271. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 44.
272. Interview with Jaouahar Ben Mubarak, in Tunis, Tunis. (May 29, 2015).
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and new irrigation techniques, but their relation to matters such as labor
conditions for women is unclear.273
Article 40 in Tunisia’s constitution stipulates that “[w]ork is a right for
every citizen, male and female alike” and gives all citizens “the right to adequate
working conditions and a fair wage,” but does not go further.274 Yet, the political
discourse on rights implementation does not, as of yet, incorporate a gendered
perspective. One reporter and human rights activist notes that outside of political
forums, “[P]eople do not even discuss economic issues in terms of the
constitution, at least not how to connect women’s rights with economic rights. It
is merely aspirational at this point.”275 For example, while the UGTT has been a
major supporter for raising the overall minimum wage, it has not placed much
emphasis on wage gender disparity.276
PART III
The extent to which the constitution-making process in Tunisia drew on
international influences is unclear. Unlike in countries like South Africa or
Sudan, the NCA in Tunisia never clearly manifested its intent to incorporate
aspects of international law into its constitutional text.277 Inconsistencies
between state practices at the international level verses national and subnational
levels further question the relevance of international law in Tunisia’s transition
efforts moving forward. Transnational entities did work closely with local CSOs
as advisors, monitors, and co-coordinators and provided significant funding to
various CSO initiatives. This first section of Part III will take a brief look at
some of the discrepancies between relevant international agreements and the
priority given to international law in relation to Tunisia’s new constitution and
national legislation. The section thereafter will look at the interaction between
Tunisian civil society and visible international actors. Our conclusion is that
while the rights provisions in Tunisia’s constitution do not fully incorporate
standards of international law, those provisions can be seen as “intermestic” in
the sense that they are the product of softer modes of international influence,
predominantly the role of international actors in promoting liberal notions of
human rights within Tunisia’s civil society.

273. For more information on proposals and the conditions of Tunisian women in agriculture
more generally, see ENQUETE SUR LES CONDITIONS DE TRAVAIL DES FEMMES EN MILIEU RURAL,
ASSOCIATION
TUNISIENNE
DES
FEMMES
DEMOCRATES.
(2015),
http://femmesdemocrates.org.tn/bibliotheque-atfd/livre-pdf/livre%20francais.pdf.
274. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 40.
275. Interview with Oumayma Ben Abdallah, in Tunis, Tunis. (May 29, 2015).
276. Id.
277. See Part I: Countries in Transition: Building a Public Participatory Framework for Gender
Rights.
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A. Supremacy of International Law
Tunisia has signed and ratified human rights treaties CEDAW (1985),278
ICCPR (1969),279 and ICESCR (1969).280 It officially removed reservations “not
in conflict with provisions in Chapter I of the Tunisian Constitution” in 2014.281
While Tunisia’s new constitution does not expressly incorporate provisions from
these texts, international observers have recognized a general incorporation of
international standards for women’s rights under customary international law.282
There is some ambiguity, however, regarding the relationship between
international law and national law, particularly in the context of judicial
interpretation. Article 20 of the Tunisian Constitution gives primacy to
“international agreements approved and ratified by the Chamber of the People’s
Deputies” over national laws but will remain “inferior to the Constitution.”283
International observers as well as organizations like the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) have questioned this ordering of laws, pointing to other models that
maintain international law as supreme.284 Members of the constitutive committee
responsible for drafting Article 20 explain, however, that the intent was not to
undermine Tunisia’s international obligations, but to allow for the use of
international laws as interpretive tools in clarifying ambiguities in the national
laws, especially in relation to women’s rights.285
The constitutionalization of international agreements as supreme over
Tunisia’s national laws is significant. However, there are ways the state can
limit, if not make obsolete, the relevance of international law at the national
level. Tunisia’s repeal of all reservations under CEDAW is a good example of
this. In April 2014 Tunisia released a general statement committing itself to the
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and withdrew all
reservations it submitted when it signed the CEDAW.286 Though lauded as a
move toward greater international accountability for gender equality, Tunisia

278. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
279. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
280. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.; S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
281. See General declaration under “Tunisia” or footnote 79. Chapter I of the Tunisian
Constitution is comprised of Articles 1-20 affirming the general principles upon which the
constitution is based.
282. Joint Statement by Al Bawsala, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch,
Tunisia: Let constitution Herald Human Rights Era – Judges should base interpretation on
international standards (Jan. 31, 2014).
283. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 26, 2014, art. 20.
284. The Tunisian Constitution in Light of International Law and Standards, INT’L COMM. OF
JURISTS (Jan. 31, 2014), http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/ICJTunisian-Constitution-Position-Paper-31-01-14.pdf.
285. Ben Mubarak, supra note 272.
286. Tunisia: Landmark Action on Women’s Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/30/tunisia-landmark-action-womens-rights.
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maintains that it will not make legislative decisions that contradict Chapter I of
the Constitution.287 This leaves open the question of how Tunisia will balance
cultural practices with international standards.
B. The Role of International Actors in Constitution-Making
“International organizations have been working with us closely – it is a
good dynamic and we like that they are wanting to be involved,” says Saida
Rached.288 Notable international supporters included UN agencies like UN
Development Programme (UNDP), which helped bring politicians and
representatives from other countries to speak to the assembly.289 The British
Embassy was likewise supportive by inviting members to hear from and consult
with foreign analysis.290 The Venice Commission also coordinated international
experts with Tunisian politicians to present “foundational best practices” and
facilitated brainstorming among local NGOs.291
Countries that sent democracy experts included the US, France, Canada,
Belgium, Spain, and Poland.292 Interviewees also noted significant participation
of former Soviet and Sub-Saharan states. Both regions seemed eager to share
insights, given their recent drafting experiences and ongoing transition efforts.
Many echoed a sentiment that there was at most “influential pressure- we felt
their opinions were important, and they let us know when we were on the ‘right
track’, or how we could make the drafting process more effective. There was no
sense that they were imposing their ideas on us.”293 A healthy level of skepticism
seems to color remarks towards the international presence in Tunisia, but no one
has yet expressed frustration that ideas were imposed or entirely irrelevant.294
Others have suggested that some international organizations were less
imposing than others. Salsabil Klibi argues that, “Yes there were and are
concerns about an international takeover, direct or indirect. But I would say that
final decisions, the final document was left to Tunisians.”295 On the other hand,
there are several reports that frame the process as a period of excitement
followed by disillusionment, spurred in part by a “deluge” of international
interests that did not translate into true expertise.296 International organizations,
rather, came with a set of pre-packaged provisions not molded to the social or

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Declarations Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, supra note 32.
Rached, supra note 164.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Klibi, supra note 39.
Id.
Bilhaji, supra note 201.
Id.
Inside the Transition Bubble: International Expert Assistance in Tunisia 18, INST. FOR
INTEGRATED TRANSITIONS (Apr. 2013), http://www.ifit-transitions.org/publications/inside-thetransition-bubble-international-expert-assistance-in-tunisia.
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political context. Some interviewees suggested that the priorities of international
organizations were misaligned with priorities of Tunisians.297 Foreign
development groups such as USAID overemphasized the fostering of
ideological values such as democratic awareness and gender equality at the
expense of substantive, arguably more critical issues related to youth
unemployment, openness in the media, and economic stability.298 There was
concurrently a tendency to generalize Tunisia’s situation with that of Egypt and
Libya: “Tunisians do not universally align themselves with other North-African
states,” remarked one activist. “Some are more francophonized, others connect
with countries like Morocco and Algeria, and still others just see our country as
unique unto itself.”299
“International support is very important, but what is more important is
developing a power structure that connects regions within Tunisia. UGTT is less
involved with what is happening internationally and more engaged with local
interests,” said Habiba Mizoumi, National Secretary General for Dentists &
Nurses for the UGTT.300 Indeed, decades of political and economic repression of
Tunisia’s southern interior under both the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes
created high disparity between this region and Tunisia’s coastal regions.301 Thus,
other individuals, like Habiba, have felt that establishing local autonomy and
strengthening channels of interregional communication will be of greater
significance in determining Tunisia’s future than in establishing relationships
with international forces.
Young civil society organizations (CSOs) in particular have been willing to
work with international funders as a way to jump-start their initiatives. Hadia
Bilhajj, director at CAWTAR stated, “we can’t shut the door on the international
community. It plays a necessary role in financing and investing in our broken
economy. But Tunisians are certainly skeptical of whether the interests of the
international community are truly aligned with their own. So we take a risk, out
of necessity.”302 Souhayel Hedfi from Jam3ity—a civil society organization
aggregator and networking platform—sees his relationship with foreign funders
as more of a mutually beneficial learning experience:
“Some funders still want to contribute to human rights and
democratization exclusively. We wanted that in the beginning, but now
the situation is different. Many NGOs in the southern interior for
example are now focused on environmental or infrastructural issues. The
funders are slow to catch on but they’re receptive to feedback when we

297. Interview with Student and Activist, NGO workshop, in Bizerte, Tunis. (June 4, 2015).
298. Inst. for Integrated Transitions, supra note 296, at 10.
299. Student and Activist, supra note 175.
300. Mizoumi, supra note 159.
301. Issandr El Amrani, Tunisia Moves to the Next Stage, MIDDLE EAST RES. & INFO. PROJECT
(Nov. 8 2011), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero110811.
302. Bilhaji, supra note 201.
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tell them the requirements for funding don’t match our interests or what
we see as priority in our country.”303
Many international democracy and rule of law organizations limit or
narrow the reform process to a fight against corruption and the formalization of
liberalism through free and fair elections, while overlooking the need for
structural reforms. “Transparency” and “good governance” metrics nested
within a market model are prioritized over the public protection of individual
human rights. The key, thus, will be to see if international entities moving
forward will view their efforts as a collaborative rather than delegated process.
International support in implementing the rights enshrined in Tunisia’s
constitution will largely depend on reception of and adaptability to local
interests.
PART IV
A. The Way Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities
A constitution is both fundamental, and authoritative, but it is also
dependent on robust institutions for implementation and enforcement, as well as
legal and political will and a culture of constitutionalism. A critical question
before the Tunisian framers of the constitution is the question of a normative
hierarchy in rights. Tunisian civil society is defined by its heterogeneity and its
goal of translating the constitution into national laws. The passage of the
constitution from the transitional into the permanent phase requires the
collaboration of efforts of inter-governmental agencies and the constant
vigilance of civil society.
Tunisia can learn from other countries, from both those countries’
successes and failures. But there must be a fine balance in place to reach out for
international assistance where needed without letting international actors hijack
the reform process altogether. Hailed as a success, the text accomplishes this
goal. It will be important in this next phase for local processes to continue to
drive implementation initiatives, albeit with ample access to international
resources and support. International and foreign actors must likewise support
local actors in facilitating transparency and open society while maintaining
respect for local interests.
In the context of enforcement, quite often gender equality and women’s
rights can be jettisoned at the altar of competing rights. The courts must enforce
gender equality as a non-derogable right that cannot be subordinated by culture
or religion. Taking into account these concerns among others, this section
examines the way forward for women in Tunisia and the next steps in the
Tunisian constitution reform process.

303.

Hedfi, supra note 50.
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B. Advancing a Culture of Constitutional Rights
Strengthening a culture of constitutional rights involves ensuring that
institutions are governed according to the constitution and that the independence
of the judiciary is safeguarded to adjudicate constitutional rights claims and to
hold state and non-state actors compliant with the constitution. This involves
providing access to justice and strengthening the rule of law so that all persons,
including women, can access courts and other adjudicatory mechanisms to
enforce the constitution and the laws made to implement it.304 Protecting the
integrity of the constitution involves limiting the erosion of constitutional
guarantees, and in particular preventing a narrow interpretation of the
constitution in a way that undermines human rights and women’s human rights
guarantees.
While the adoption of the rights and freedoms in the Constitution is
important, it may be equally important to educate citizens about these rights and
ways to safeguard them, including how citizens can vindicate their rights in
courts.305 As set out in Article 102 of the Tunisian Constitution, “The judiciary is
an independent authority that ensures the prevalence of justice, the supremacy of
the Constitution, the sovereignty of law, and the protection of rights and
freedoms.”306 This Article emphasizes that the independence of the judiciary
from legislative and executive interference is a bedrock principle of the rule of
law. That is why the constitution-making process does not end at the
promulgation of the constitution but is a continuing process that sparks the
development of rights and establishing mechanisms to protect constitutional
guarantees.
A culture of constitutionalism must also help to build a strong, integrated
civil society that has the capacity and motivation to monitor governmental
institutions. Political transparency during the drafting process must become the
norm, such that civil society can act as a watchdog and impose accountability on
state actors without fear of repression. Activists outside the political sphere are
in the best position to ensure that there is a balance of powers among
governmental institutions and that those powers are being used in the best
interests of the people. In Tunisia, many of the youth who participated in the
2011 protests have turned to civil society groups as a way to stay active in their
country’s transition towards democracy. Disillusionment with the current
government is widespread among youth, as exhibited by low voter turnout
during the last national elections in 2014. Yet, many believe there is still space
and opportunity to build a civil society platform upon which youth can
communicate with local politicians and have their voices heard.307 Alia, a young

304. Kathleen E. Mahoney, International Strategies to Implement Equality Rights for Women:
Overcoming Gender Bias in the Courts, 1 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 115, 118-28 (1993).
305. Id.
306. TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 102.
307. Benkefi, supra note 264.
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graduate from Thala stated, “many youth have never visited places outside of
their own region. Civil society organizations have included workshops where
people from all over Tunisia can meet together and network. It’s a great aspect
of the education process and only helps our own activism locally.”308
Similar comments were made during a civil society workshop in the
northern coastal town of Bizerte. Participants were young activists from various
municipalities across the country, all of whom were involved and committed to
building small NGOs in their own communities. Hatem ben Romdhane, the
leader of an association called Irada (meaning “will” or “desire”) in Djerba
acquiesced, “there are a lot of internal challenges, but we’re doing our best.”309
Workshop activities thus centered on networking and lobbying strategies, as
well as understanding the new government’s constitutional structure.
Under Ben Ali, all civil society groups were subject to co-optation,
monitoring, and outright repression.310 Thus, most civil society groups, like
Irada, are young. Educational opportunities for those involved in such groups
are frequent. “[It] seems like every month we’re sending at least one
representative to an event like this,” remarked Hatem.311
Although many civil society groups acknowledge that the Constitution
contains strong rights provisions, they are concerned about the gap between
reality and the text of the document. Many felt driven to civil society because of
a lack of youth representation in government. “Low youth voter turnout in 2014
was a reflection of both economic and political frustrations,” commented one
participant. “For some of my friends it was a decision between going to the
polling station and going to a football match. And they chose the football
match!”312 Another participant noted that while the last elections had
significantly more international observers than in 2011 and a healthy number of
youth monitors, the problem was less process and more lack of trust: “We are all
scared of a slide back to tyranny. We are skeptical of whether our government is
truly democratic but we must continue to push for democratic elections.”313
It is again instructive to look at other countries to see how constitutional
provisions can guarantee their own enforcement and implementation. For
example, the Colombian Constitution of 1991 created a Constitutional Court and
the tutela, which empowered individuals to bring suits when their constitutional
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309. Interview with Hatem ben Romdhane, in Bizerte, Tunis. (June 5, 2015).
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(June 5, 2015).
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rights have been abridged.314 Litigants have used the new women’s protection
clauses with success in many cases. Without the tutela and the new
Constitutional Court, the women’s protection clauses may have been
meaningless.
The Tunisian state has institutional responsibility to implement the
Constitution through enabling legislation and institutions. Implementation of a
constitution can be predicated upon strengthening or setting up new institutions
provided for by the constitution, allocating powers and responsibilities,
jurisdiction, resources (including finances and staff), and monitoring
mechanisms. At the same time, the state must also stay accountable to civil
society. The constitution created three ministries of civil society, one under each
branch of government— executive, parliamentary, and judiciary.315 The strength
of these ministries relative to others, however, remains to be seen.316
C. Developing Enabling Legislation
There continues to be a push to create laws that are not just nominally
supportive of gender equality, but contain technical safeguards ensuring equality
in various spheres. Yet, it is too early to predict how the Tunisian National
Assembly will formulate enabling legislation. There is also uncertainty around
how the judiciary will go about constitutionality review. The Supreme Judicial
Council, which is tasked with the responsibility of assembling a constitutional
court, has been the subject of much controversy. Tension surrounding the
selection of members delayed its formation, which has inevitably delayed its
appointment of a new constitutional court, the deadline for which was initially
set for October 2015.317 The administrative tribunal has been designated as a
constitutional court and will hold that role until a separate court is formed.
There is general certainty among judges and legal scholars that before
assessing constitutionality of laws, the court will have to deal with
contradictions internal to the constitution itself. “It is too early to project how
these contradictions will be reconciled, let alone how the constitution will be

314. Martha I. Morgan, Emancipatory Equality: Gender Jurisprudence under the Colombian
Constitution, in BEVERLEY BAINES & RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, THE GENDER OF
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 75, 76 (2005).
315. 5 years after the Arab Spring: What’s Next for Women in the MENA Region?, WOODROW
WILSON CTR. (Mar. 8 2016) (quoting from remarks by Rangita de Silva de Alwis).
316. Id.
317
Election for the Council took place on October 23, 2016. It has yet to appoint the constitutional
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applied to forthcoming legislation,” noted Jaouahar ben Mubarak, a scholar of
constitutional law and president of the network Destourna (Our Constitution).318
President of LET Kelthoum Kennou insists that the Tunisian civil society
has played a critical role in shaping the constitution and continues to play a
pivotal role in its enforcement. This was best illustrated, she notes, in the
allocation of a communication channel by initiating the position of coordinator
with the civil society not only in the parliament but also in government and in
the presidency. This channel was particularly effective concerning the
promulgation of the law of the supreme judicial council:
Some specialized associations have worked on presenting
recommendations to the parliament. Some of them also took part in a
technical committee within the ministry of justice that is granted the
power to suggest legislations. Other associations not only made
suggestions but also presented proposal provisions to deputies for
adoption in the parliamentary committee. This was an initiative of the
League of Tunisian Women Voters (LET), which, as a part of its mission,
focuses its project on the presence of women judges as decision makers
in this council.319
One of the major impediments to implementing the constitutional
guarantees is budgetary constraints. Our interview with Hadia Bilhajj revealed
that there are currently no funds for women’s empowerment efforts, and that
even if there is in the short-term, it will likely come in the form of conditional
international aid. Resolving Tunisia’s debt and revamping the economy has
taken precedent, though this does not seem unique to women’s rights: “We
aren’t able to deal with things in parallel. We focus on one issue and ignore the
others.”320 One assembly member has noted that the strategy thus far has been
not so much to fight for a percentage of the budget, but to show how improving
the status of women will have positive economic ramifications, as described
above, regarding the draft law to combat violence against women.321
Enabling legislation plays a crucial role in securing legal equality. A
constitution on paper is hardly a constitution at all, however progressive its
contents and however careful its design. Though there is consensus that enabling
legislation is crucial to securing legal equality, such a task requires the reform of
old laws as well as the passage of new laws providing assistance to pressing
public concerns. The state, for all of its aspirations, has struggled to tackle both
simultaneously, while in the background sort itself out internally. Laws out of
sync with the constitution but not deemed critical have thus been placed on the
backburner. Government efforts under the current ruling coalition Nidaa Tounes
have more or less been dictated by realities on the ground, a game of whack-amole with a central focus on fighting terrorism, weeding out corruption,
resolving bad debt, and increasing employment.
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Hela Hammi, one of the most vocal proponents of women’s rights in the
assembly, commented that “for right now, we are leaving women’s rights efforts
in the hands of civil society, with government encouragement and support of
course. This is partly because of prioritization, but partly because civil society
organizations are tapped in.” 322
Some gender issues, carried over from the Ben Ali era, continue to hold
some political weight. The draft law against violence323 and new efforts add
vertical parity to election laws,324 both discussed in Part I, and have gained
relevance as an issue tied to universal security concerns. Other issues such as the
mirath, or inheritance laws, wage disparities, and benefits for mothers in the
workplace, such as maternity leave, are discussed but have not been fully
addressed in legislation thus far.325 Administrative judge and women’s activist
Anware Mnasri argues that the mirath laws are not a widely debated issue
among Tunisians – they are considered problematic for poor families, but that
the bigger issue is giving women an equal opportunity in the labor market and
improving the economy so that people do not have to rely on mirath.326
Some have pushed for increasing maternity leave as a part of reform in
public services law.327 At 30 days, currently Tunisia has the shortest maternity
leave of all countries in the MENA region.328 Civil servants are allowed 60 days
leave and can extend for another 60 days with a 50 percent reduction of their
wages.329 Policies that permit institutionalized forms of gender discrimination
are the most important policies for women’s rights activists to overcome. Yet,
because they are not as visible as political discrimination or as shocking as cases
of sexual violence, they may also be the most difficult issues to tackle.
There is some acknowledgment that Tunisia’s new era of gender rights
rides on guarantees under the old regime: “We don’t like to admit it, but some
laws from the Ben Ali years have benefitted women. Ben Ali was selective with
which laws he chose to support, enacting laws to further his own political
interests, but the effect of these laws has been positive.”330 Examples include a

322. Hammi, supra note 146.
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law requiring a minimum standard of pediatric health for newborns, a law
allowing women to travel without her husband or father, and a set of policies
that opened up educational opportunities to women.331
Given the plethora of concerns and reformist initiatives in the pipeline, it is
important to mandate a specific time period for the promulgation of institutions
and policies. Independent bodies for the enforcement and oversight of
constitutional rights, such as commissions and ombudsperson bodies, should be
passed in a timely manner. For example, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana called
for laws establishing nine institutions within six months of the first meeting of
the parliament after its constitution came into effect.332 The 2010 Constitution of
Kenya included a time schedule from six months to three years within which
laws on more than sixty subjects were to be passed, and it provided a cause of
action if a law listed in the schedule was not promulgated within the time
specified.333
Additionally, there must be a constitutional review of the legal system to
ensure that all laws are in compliance with constitutional guarantees and if
necessary the repeal of laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution.
Finally, steps should be taken to monitor the implementation of the
constitution. It is important to carry out a regular evaluation of institutions
established under the constitutions to ensure that they have the resources,
including financial and human resources, to implement the constitutional
guarantees. For example, Section 5 of the sixth schedule of the 2010 Kenyan
Constitution calls for a commission on the implementation of the constitution to
“monitor, facilitate and oversee the development of legislation and
administrative procedures as required to implement the Constitution.”334
Remedies for inaction on the part of the government in meeting
constitutional guarantees create a remedy for non-enforcement of rights.
Constitutional courts can be moved through a writ petition or, as in India, where
Article 32 (1) provides that the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights is guaranteed.335
D. A Focus on Gender and Economic Rights
Tunisian women’s rights activists are concerned that the debates on
constitutional guarantees have not focused sufficiently on economic

331. Id.
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development and its corresponding impact on women.336 Development
initiatives ranging from the expansion of global trade, to structural readjustment
programs, to a diversion of public spending from social to military programs, all
have a disproportionate impact on women and the burdens they carry. While the
discourse on women’s rights often centers on a narrow range of ‘genderized’
issues such as sexual violence, women’s political participation, and
discriminatory rape laws, there is a need to acknowledge that gender-neutral
policies can have equally negative implications. All issues, be it social,
economic, political, or legal, have wider, gender-based implications that must be
assessed within their specific local contexts.
The question of how to pair economic development with women’s rights
ties in to concerns around social stability and security. A Pew poll showed that
69 percent of women in Tunisia (compared to 55 percent of men) prefer stability
to democracy, although their conceptions of stability and security are different
from that of men – for example, women see security as the ability to go out
alone, to be free from harassment on the street, at work, and on the part of
police.337 Men see security as more the presence of a police force and a reduced
threat of terrorism.338 This did not, however, correlate with waning support for
equal rights for women (66 percent), a fair judiciary, and competitive
elections.339 Nevertheless, a preference for stability over democracy leaves open
the possibility for women to forgo ideological agendas that require long-term
foresight in exchange for practical, short-term solutions.340
Preference for stability is increasing in light of Tunisia’s economy, which
has stagnated if not receded since the revolution. High unemployment rates
among young women, reaching 50 percent in some areas, have created
increasing dependence on male figures in their household as the primary
breadwinners.341 The situation is particularly volatile for women in Tunisia’s
historically underserved and economically repressed interior regions.
Agricultural work – mainly on small plots or family farms – provides
employment for the vast majority of women laborers in this region. Women
activists in rural areas and in the capital are grappling with how to undo decades
of state-intervention that has led to price distortion, inequitable profit
distributions, and substandard working conditions for women in this sector.342
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Habiba Mizoumi, National Secretary General for Dentists & Nurses for the
UGTT, has also felt that gender equality must be approached holistically and has
worked within her role to weave health and other welfare services into economic
development proposals. “You can’t rid society of gender based violence and
expand rights for women without improving the economy and a woman’s ability
to participate within it. So we have to think about all of these aims at once.”343
She says the key to UGTT’s strength has been its vast network that allows even
those at the national level to interact with laborers in remote areas at the “bottom
rung” of Tunisia’s economy. “I work with midwives, nurses, and other wage
laborers in hospitals across the country. It is eye opening to hear their concerns,
hear about their working conditions, and identify what their interests are.”
Nevertheless, the approach to infusing gender initiatives within economic
development is not systematic. As noted by Hammi, the government has not
tackled gender as a cross-sector issue, but rather as a separate item to be dealt
with after more pressing issues have been addressed.344
This fear that gender equality and security takes second place to other
issues that are considered more pressing is concerning and haunts many
communities in post conflict and transitional justice. However, unless gender
equality is treated as an imperative to democracy building and the rule of law,
security cannot be sustained.
E. The Need for Accelerated Civil Society Engagement
Women are often mobilized during revolutions and nationalist struggles,
but afterwards they are re-marginalized. Common themes emerge from research
into women’s participation in revolutionary struggles: men may be reluctant to
embrace women’s participation in the struggle, but do so in order to reach the
desired and common goal.345 The re-emergence of male prerogative follows the
achievement of the goal and any attempt to deal with women’s subordination is
viewed as a distraction from the struggle, and revolutionary rhetoric fails to
However, women who
translate into post-conflict policy changes.346
participated in revolutionary struggles often develop a political awareness that
changes the construction of the political community.
Women who feel marginalized by the transitional process have turned to
civil society activism. Efforts in Tunisia seem to focus on increasing youth
voter turnout in the next elections, pushing for horizontal parity layered on top
of vertical parity to increase women political representation, and passing laws
against violence against women.
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F. Building Institutions
The promise of the Tunisian Constitution can only be attained through
institutional design. For example, in Scotland, the Standing Orders of the
Parliament mandate that all bills are accompanied by a statement of their
potential impact on equal opportunities, including gender equality.347 Similarly,
Section 187 of the South African Constitution called for the setting up of a
Commission for Gender Equality and its role is to monitor, investigate, research,
educate, lobby, advise and report on issues concerning gender equality.348
Tunisia’s transition has largely centered on its Law on Establishing and
Organizing Transitional Justice, passed during the last days of the Ennahda
government on December 24, 2013. One of its most critical provisions allows
for criminal accountability for past human rights violations.349 Chambers in the
civil court system will have the jurisdiction to adjudicate past violations and
abuses by military and security forces. The law also includes provisions for
victim reparation,350 institutional reform, vetting of civil servants,351 and national
reconciliation.352
The Truth Commission was intended to be one of the primary mechanisms
established under the new law to dismantle the old regime and pave the way for
transition. Its task is to uncover past abuses committed from independence in
July 1955 to 2013. It is composed of a 15-member panel of human rights
activists, representatives of opposition associations under the Ben Ali regime,
and independent jurists.353 The powers of the commission are broad, including
the ability to subpoena witnesses, access state archives, summon public
hearings, provide protections for testifiers, and even reopen past cases, though
some challenge this as unconstitutional.354 Finally, the commission can refer
gross violations to specialized chambers, which have yet to be formed.355 The
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deadline was last set for the end of 2015.356 The law mandates that judges for
such chambers cannot have “participated in trials of a political nature,” but it
does not specify further.357
The commission’s formation and validity, however, have been subject to
strict scrutiny. Individuals who participated in the Ben Ali regime and continue
to hold positions in government expressed concern that they would be unfairly
targeted. Many critics who later formed part of the Nidaa Tounes coalition
pushed to amend the commission rules and replace its members. “There was a
lot of drama between Essebsi and the commission’s president Sihem Ben
Sedrine. He accused her of conspiring with Marzouki [the former president],
being too radical, too driven by her own vendettas, and on and on,”358
commented one journalist following the commission’s developments. Others
question her ability to guide the commission with adequate insight, given her
prolonged absence outside of Tunisia prior to 2011.359 There is some
acknowledgment that the media in Tunisia has been particularly hostile towards
the Commission, fueling further public skepticism.360 Juan E. Mendez, UN
Special Rapporteur on Torture expressed his concerns in 2014 and called for a
need for “impartial, thorough investigations,” noting that “[t]orture and ill
treatment continues to take place in Tunisia” and that in spite of this reality he
remained hopeful that the commission would bring “access to justice and redress
for victims.”361
To smooth over tensions, on May 25, 2015 the Minister of Justice released
a statement on the state’s ongoing efforts in the realm of transitional justice,
including its commitment to bring expert judges on transitional justice into the
process and to create spaces for civil society groups to access information and
give feedback on judiciary reform and the dignity and rehabilitation fund.362
Closed-door testimonies began in May 2015, with public hearings
following in June. Since hearings began, over 20,000 victims have come
forward as testament of the state’s systematic use of sexual violence to silence
women members of the opposition.363 Although the details of these hearings is
tomorrow/.
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beyond the scope of this Article, the establishment of the commission and its
work, though politically polarizing, logistically incoherent, and as of yet
incomplete, has been noted as a “rare opportunity to push forward new rights
claims for Tunisian women that move beyond the secular/Islamic division.”364
CONCLUSION
The historic exclusion of women from official peace processes and
constitutional reform processes brings into question the validity of the model
upon which constitutional processes rest. A review of fourteen peace
negotiations since 1992 shows that less than 8 percent of the negotiating teams
were women and less than 3 percent of the signatories were women. It is then
not surprising that “of the 585 peace agreements signed since 1990, only 92
mention women.”365
Tunisia’s constitutional process provided the terrain for the coalescence of
women as a critical presence. It was a moving, diverse, and electrifying terrain
upon which women gathered across political divides to build common cause.
The constitution-making process provided a landscape for women to move their
concerns from the margin to the center of the constitutional debates and to
articulate a visionary and detailed agenda for action. The official constitution
has laid the groundwork for future work, but much more must be done to ensure
that women’s rights that exist in theory come to exist in reality.
What the Tunisian constitution-drafting project shows is that women’s
participation in constitution-making is critical to ensuring women’s rights and
priorities are included in a nationwide dialogue. The very legitimacy of a
constitution hinges on whether women are engaged in the creation, adoption and
implementation of their constitutions. Nevertheless, we should resist
characterizing the nature of women’s participation in constitution-making
uniformly. Women were present on both sides of the debate. Perhaps their
greatest contribution was in ensuring that everyone’s voice was heard and one
narrative did not wholly drown out the other.
Similarly, international actors can aid constitution-making processes by
protecting and promoting processes that are both democratic and transparent.
International women’s groups can also provide needed resources and technical
support. Of course, while transnational groups are helpful in building
transnational coalitions, they in no way stand as a proxy to national and local
civil society groups. National and local NGOs should lead efforts to galvanize
existing women’s groups and form broad-based coalitions. Transnational groups
Anything?, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2016,
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should only step in as second-fiddle supporters who can further assist or
facilitate such grassroots efforts. This will be important to note with the growing
number of local participants in Tunisia’s women’s rights discourse and the
emergence of transnational solidarity links.
Meaningful participation of women in the Constitution drafting in Tunisia
involved two singular aspects: (1) women in the constituent assembly and (2) an
active and organized coalition of women’s groups. Although women in the
constituent assembly symbolized the state’s commitment to gender equality, the
mere appointment of women to the body was insufficient. The most vital aspect
in this project was an effective coalition of women’s groups. The open forums
are an educational opportunity for the entire country and they allowed for debate
and discussion on issues that were considered outside the public realm. As
founding mothers of a landmark constitution, the involvement of women
energized and empowered women like never before and had significant
influence on raising constitutive and transformative aspects of constitution
drafting. However, if the process is to be truly transformative, women must
continue to participate beyond the initial promulgation of the constitution.
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